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Abstract:  Most organ transplants are from dead donors. National transplant organizations exhibit 
considerable differences in terms of their donor population rates. Spain’s organization is by far the 
most efficient in this respect. We argue that much of the productivity advantage of Spain’s transplant 
organization proceeds from an efficient organization of the production chain, from organ procurement 
to transplantation. Transplant inputs from dead donors are analogous to a common resource for the 
transplant community. Their circulation through the national transplant organization creates public 
good  externalities  between  the  care  units  in  charge  of  organ  extraction  and  those  in  charge  of 
transplantation.  It  is  shown  that  a  socially  efficient  production  of  transplant  services  requires  an 
optimal control of both the production and the circulation of transplant inputs by the institutions of the 
transplant system. 
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The demand for life-saving transplant surgery grows in most of countries. However, the organ donor 
rates as well as the total number of transplants differ tremendously from one country to another. 
During the last ten years, Spain appears as the champion of the dead donor league. Considering that 
90% of organ transplants, in general, are coming from dead donors
1, it is crucial to understand the 
reasons of such a success. In practice, the Spanish transplant system improves survival, it increases 
organ  demand,  and  more  and  more  people  are  taking  advantage  from  transplantation.  For  many 
commentators, these achievements clearly show that organ donation is the limiting factor to treat 
certain pathologies. This is certainly partly true, but still insufficient to explain the differences, in 
terms of production efficiency, of transplant care systems around the world. We argue in this article 
that the problem is not only, and perhaps not mainly, with the lack of donors per se, but, rather, with 
the organization of the transplant system, and notably of its production side.  
                                                 
1 IRODaT, 2006. A surprisingly small number of papers concentrate on organization aspects in the economic literature 
on organ transplants. Notable exceptions are the recent contributions of Roth, Sönmez and Ünver 
(2004, 2005ab, 2006). They consider the case of live kidney donations, and design theoretical patterns 
of gift-exchange for efficient pairwise matching of kidney donors and recipients from a given set of 
pairs of incompatible donor and recipient. They present numerical simulations of the impact of such 
discrete optimization procedures on transplant provision, and consider the practical implementation of 
these procedures by means of specialized clearinghouses (see notably Roth et alii (2005a) concerning 
the latter).  
As recalled above, and acknowledged by these authors themselves (e.g. Roth et alii (2004)), most 
transplanted  kidneys,  as  most  transplanted  organs  in  general,  are  from  cadavers.  Law  commonly 
makes cadaveric transplant donation much easier than live transplant donation, notably by presuming 
the  consent  of deceased  donors.  For  instance,  in  many  countries,  consent is taken  for  granted  in 
principle if the brain-dead patient has not expressed her/his refusal explicitly before death through 
some relevant legal procedure (usually, his/her registration on an ad hoc legal file). The medical staff 
in charge of organ procurement is generally submitted to an obligation to check the wishes of the 
deceased regarding donation, by interviewing close relative. Moreover, refusal rates usually are much 
lower than 50% in organ donations interviews: 15% in Spain, but also 27% in France and 39% in the 
UK for example. These facts point to the crucial importance, for the productive efficiency of the 
transplant care organization, of the latter’s ability in identifying and exploiting opportunities of organ 
procurement from cadaveric donations.  
This  article  develops  an  economic  model  of  the  transplant  care  system  within  existing  legal 
environments, with a particular emphasis on the organization of the production side of the system. The 
ban of organs markets makes transplants a common resource, collected mainly by “exhortation”, that 
is,  notably,  by  public  calls  for  donation  (Thorne  (2000,  2006)).  The  bulk  of  the  “resource”  is 
constituted by brain-dead patients randomly distributed in hospitals through the statistical variety of 
death circumstances, and physically non-transferable for a variety of reasons that notably include the 
stringent legal obligations relative to the body of the deceased. This initial distribution of the common 
resource is naturally mismatched, in general, with the statistical distribution of the needs of grafts for transplantation in care production units. Operating an appropriate match of resources and “needs” in 
transplant inputs is the basic reason for the existence of institutions in charge of circulating grafts, 
such as national transplant agencies, as substitutes for banned transplant markets. Grafts are produced 
by hospitals, and circulated by the transplant agency, to be used by other hospitals as inputs in their 
final production  of transplant care  services.  Hospital’s intermediary  graft production thus  induces 
public good external effects on others’ final production of care services. The resulting public good 
issues are captured through principal-agent interactions, in subgame-perfect equilibria of two-stage 
games where hospitals are only concerned with their own final production of care services while the 
transplant agency maximizes a social utility function that aggregates hospitals’ preferences (Bergstrom 
(1989), Cornes and Silva (1999)). It is notably shown that: (i) a socially optimal control of the agency 
over both the circulation and the production of graft inputs achieves social optimum ; (ii) while a 
socially  optimal  control  by  the  agency  of  circulation  alone  generally  implies  suboptimal  under-
provision of transplant inputs and services. We argue that the model so captures an essential cause of 
the remarkable achievements of the Spanish transplant organization. 
The paper develops as follows. Section 2 analyzes the Spanish transplant organization. Section 3 
presents the model of the transplant care system. Section 4 sets and solves the public good problem of 
graft production and circulation. Section 5 concludes. An appendix collects the proofs.  
 
2. Spain’s transplant organization 
 
The history of organs transplantations in Spain begins in 1965, with the first transplants in Madrid and 
Barcelona. In 1979, a law is adopted to favour the development of transplantations but donations 
remain at a low level during the eighties. 
In 1989, the Organizacion Nacional de Trasplantes (ONT) is created to solve this problem. It is an 
institution belonging to the Ministry of Health and Consumption, put in charge of developing the 
competencies relative to the provision and clinical utilization of organs and tissues. To carry out these 
tasks, it functions as a technical operative unit and fulfils its mission of coordinating the activities of 
donation, extraction, preservation, distribution, exchange, and transplantation of organs and tissues throughout the whole Spanish Health Care System. At the creation of the ONT, the main idea was that 
the problem was not with the number of donors but with their identification and the organization of the 
program. 
After the creation of the ONT, Spain went from 14 donors per million population (pmp) in 1989 to 
36,4 donors pmp in 2006. This evolution displayed in the graphic below made Spain evolve from 
donation rates ranked in intermediate-low positions in Europe to the highest rate not just in Europe, 
but also worldwide. 
Evolution of organs donors rate in Spain 





























How has this been possible? The origin of this spectacular change is internationally known as the 
“Spanish Model”, a series of measures taken in this country to improve organ donation. This model, 
widely described in the scientific literature, has been recommended by the World Health Organization 
and is being applied in different regions of the World with outcomes very similar to those obtained in 
Spain. 
Spanish transplant law is very similar to the corresponding laws in other Western countries. Although 
the law on transplant donation presumes the consent of deceased potential donors, according to a 
subsequent  decree  relatives  of  a  potential  donor  must  be  approached  to  determine  the  deceased's 
wishes  regarding  organ  donation.  In  the  absence  of  this  knowledge,  close  relatives  can  sign  the 
authorization, after internal discussion if required. At present, Spain’s annual refusal rate for organ 
donation is  around  15% of  all donation  interviews. Death is defined  as  the total  and  irreversible 
cessation of brain or cardio-respiratory functions. Clinical evaluation and complimentary tests required are detailed within the legal text allowing organ retrieval either from brain-stem death donors or from 
non-heart-beating  donors.  Like  other  coordinating  systems  worldwide,  the  Spanish  system  has  to 
monitor the management of waiting lists, organ allocation, and statistical analysis. Nevertheless, it was 
considered that a continuous monitoring system over the entire organ donation process was essential. 
A network of health-care professionals responsible for the organ donation process as a whole has been 
set up at all levels (national, regional and hospital). This implies the need for training, organization 
and coordination of activities. 
It was considered that these professionals working at the grass roots level must feel involved and that 
they must be accountable for performance. Most of them are physicians, mainly intensive care unit 
(ICU) specialists, and they belong to the staff of the hospital. They generally continue in their medical 
role,  but  as  transplant  coordinators  their  main  objective  is  to  improve  the  organ  donation  rate. 
Currently, 155 hospitals are officially authorized to take care of organ donor programs. A quality 
control system has been developed for the organ donor process - the ICU mortality registry and the 
brain death registry - a common practice in most of them. By law (RD 2070, 30 December 1999), 
transplant coordinators are the professionals responsible for the whole donation and retrieval process. 
National and regional offices are service agencies supporting the organ donation and transplantation 
programs. They deal with organ sharing and waiting list management. They arrange organ or team 
shifts. They are responsible for the official statistics and reports on organ donation and transplantation. 
They promote legal statements and binding consensus guidelines. They also promote public education 
and address any doubt or question about organ donation and transplantation. A 24-h hot line and E-
mail system have been put in place to keep all interested groups or individuals informed. They are also 
concerned  with  and involved  in  training  and research  programs.  Any  activity  that  could improve 
donation or facilitate the transplant team activities can be promoted through this network. 
Organ transplantation has been considered a hospital medical activity for which a specific budget and 
staff are allocated. This kind of activity does not induce any budgetary overload for hospitals. The 
annual general budget for transplantation procedures in Spain is around 180 million Euros. The annual 
budget for the organ procurement network is around 15 million Euros (less than 10% of the budget 
covering organ procurement activities). The general donation budget covers all extra-salary and extra-time activities of both coordinators and surgical retrieval teams, as well as any donor evaluation tests, 
the ICU bed daily costs, etc. This budget also covers coordinating offices, training courses and some 
of  the  educational  programs.  The  type  of  payment  for  the  extra  work  of  coordination  and  organ 
retrieval for professionals in charge differs depending on the region. It can be a fixed amount, or it can 
be based on registered activity, or be determined according to a mixed system (it does not usually 
exceed 30% of total salary). 
Table 1 shows that the Spanish organ donor rate per million population is the highest around the 
world. The  British  rate  is  only  37,5%  of  the  Spanish  rate  and the  French rate  69,5%. We  could 
compute in table 2 a rough estimate of the number of patients waiting for kidney transplantation that 
would obtain in several countries if they achieved the same donor rate as Spain.  
 
Table 1: Organs Donor Rates per 1 million population in 2006 
  2006 
Australia  9 
Canada  14,8 
France  25,3 
Greece  5,8 
Israel  7,7 
Italy  20,9 
Spain  36,4 
Sweden  14,5 
UK  13 
United States  26,6 
  
Table 2: Projections of the 2006 Spanish rate on other countries 
  Cadaveric donors (1)  Kidneys transplants (1)  Patients  awaiting  for  a 
transplant in 2007 (2) 
Australia  202  330  1388 
Australia*  565  1334  343 
Canada  468  712  4195 
Canada*  1151  1751  1705 
France  1441  2352  6491 
France*  2073  3383  4511 
Greece  74  144  903 
Greece*  464  903  144 
Israel  68  87  540 
Israel*  321  411  114 
Italy  1239  2932  7096 
Italy*  2157  5106  4074 
UK  633  1240  6876 
UK*  1772  3472  3472 
United States  8022  10659  76313 
United States*  10909  14496  55767 
(*)Numbers in italic are calculated using the national rates of Table 1  
(1) Source: IRODaT 2006 
(2) Source: Council of Europe, Transplant Newsletter, September 2008 
 
To  sum  up,  the  Spanish  model  consists  in  a  program  designed  to  optimize  every  stages  of  the 
transplantation process from the identification of a potential donor. Many factors contribute to the extraordinary increase of the Spanish dead-donor rate during the last 20 years. Of course, Spain was a 
pioneer of the opt-out system
2, but its success mainly proceeds from an excellent network of organ-
transplant teams operating in hospitals, which routinely screen patients’ records to identify donors, and 
impulse and coordinate the multiple tasks following donors’ identification.  
 
3-A model of production of transplant care services 
 
The  simple  medical  care  system  that  we  consider  here  is  made  of  care  production  units,  named 
hospitals,  and  a  transplant  agency  in  charge  of  collecting  transplants  produced  from  cadavers  by 
hospitals, and of distributing them to transplant care units. The use of grafts by hospitals is constrained 
by the following two complementary rules: they must transfer to the transplant agency any graft they 
produce; and they must use for transplant care services any graft they receive from the transplant 
agency. We suppose, for simplicity, undifferentiated resources and needs in transplant inputs (say, a 
single medical indication for transplantation, such as kidney pathology, for example), and hospitals 
identical  in  all  respects  except  their  potential  resources  in  graft  inputs  (their  brain-dead  patients, 
principally). 
 
3-1-Agents and commodities 
 
There are n hospitals,  2 n ³ , designated by an index i  running in  {1,..., } N n = . The transplant agency 
is denoted by index i =0. 
We  partition  the  set of care  services  provided by  hospitals into  two  broad  classes,  namely:  Care 
services requiring transplants of organs or tissues such as heart, kidney, liver, lung, skin, cornea, bone 
marrow etc.; and all other care services. We assume that the transplant care services of hospital i , on 
the  one  hand,  and  its  other  care  services,  on  the  other  hand,  are  measurable  by  homogeneous 
                                                 
2  In  the  opt-out  donation  system,  consent  is  presumed  for  deceased  donors  unless  she/he  registered  on  an 
appropriate refusal file when alive. In most opt-out systems, the next of kin’s approval is also required. Spain, 
France, Italy for instance presume consent. In the opt-in system of donation, on the contrary, those willing to 
give their organs upon death must sign up as donors. Countries with opt-out systems have high deceased-donor 
rates.  continuous variables, respectively denoted by  i x  and  i y . Moreover, each hospital i  is susceptible to 
produce grafts from cadavers in homogeneous continuous quantity  i z . The final output of the medical 
care  system  in  transplant  care  services  (resp.  other  care  services)  is  vector  ( ) 1, , n x x x = ¼   (resp.  
( ) 1, , n y y y = ¼ ). Its intermediary production of transplants is vector  ( ) 1, , n z z z = ¼ . We denote by 
/ n i z the vector obtained from  z  by deleting its ith-component  i z , and by  / ( , ’ ) n i i z z  the vector obtained 
from  z  and z’ by substituting  ’i z  for  i z  in z . 
Likewise, we bunch the variable inputs of the production of care services in two broad types, also 
viewed as homogeneous continuous quantities, that is, for any hospital i : Transplants, denoted by real 
variable  i t ; and other inputs, labelled “general” inputs in the sequel, and denoted by real variables 
x
i v  
if they are used in the production of transplant care services, 
y
i v  if they are used in the production of 
other (final) care services, and  
z
i v  if they are used in the production of grafts.  We let  ( , , )
x y z
i i i i v v v v = , 
1 ( ,..., )
r r r
n v v v =  for any  { , , } r x y z Î , and  1 ( ,..., ) n v v v = . 
We use the following notations for vectors of 
n R ,  1 n ³ :  n e  is the diagonal vector (1,...,1) of 
n R ; for 
any pair ( , ') x x  of vectors of 
n R ,  ' x x ³  if  ' i i x x ³  for all i ,  ' x x >  if  ' x x ³  and  ' x x ¹ ,  ' x x ≫  if 
' i i x x >  for all  i ; 
n
+ R  is the non-negative orthant of 
n R , that is, set { : 0}
n x x Î ³ R , and 
n
++ R  is its 
positive orthant { : 0}




Hospitals’ potential of graft production is mainly determined, in practice, by the random distribution 
of brain-dead patients in hospitals and by refusal rates in donation interviews. This essential feature of 
the reality of transplant activities, which may be appropriately construed as a set of operative rationing 
constraints over both graft production and transplant care services, is captured in the model notably 
through an exogenous endowment of potential graft production of the hospital, viewed as a non-negative  homogeneous  continuous  quantity,  and  denoted  by  i w   for  hospital  i .
3  This  endowment 
operates as an upper bound for hospital’s graft production. We let  1 ( ,..., ) n w w w = , and suppose that 
0 w ≫ .  
Technically  efficient  production  of  hospital  i   is  depicted  through  a  triple  of  production 
functions ( ) , ,
x y z
i i i i f f f f =   transforming  nonnegative  combinations  of  inputs 
4 ( , ) i i t v + Îℝ   into 
technically  efficient  output  combinations  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , , , , , , ( , )
x y z
i i i i i i i i i i i i x y z f t v f t v f t v = .  The  formal 
assumption below supposes, in addition to the standard working hypotheses of differentiability and 
concavity, the following main features for hospitals’ identical production techniques. General inputs 
are indispensable for production of any type (assumption 1-(ii)), and are productive in each type of 
production taken separately (assumptions 1-(iv) and 1-(v)) and also in the three types of production 
taken  jointly  (assumption  1-(vi)).  Transplants  are  indispensable  and  productive  in  transplant  care 
services  (assumptions  1-(iii)-(iv)),  and  in  them  only  (assumption  1-(v)).  Technology  exhibits  a 
crowding externality between the three types of activities of each hospital (transplant care services, 
other care services, and graft production), specified as follows: Increasing the scale of production in 
terms of total general inputs in a hospital diminishes the productivity of general inputs in all types of 
production of this hospital, due to the crowding of a number of fixed inputs implicit in the production 
function, such as wards, operating theatres, surgery teams etc. (assumptions 1-(iv) and 1-(v)). Finally, 
                                                 
3 Refusal rates in donation interviews, in particular, are treated as exogenous in this model, the latter’s object 
being  the  analysis  of  the  efficiency  of  production  organization,  from  the  extraction  of  donated  organs  to 
transplantation.  Diminishing  refusal  rates  and  improving  the  organization  of  production  are  the  two  main 
channels for improving the global efficiency of transplant care systems as measured by their donor population 
rates. The first channel supposes appropriate exhortation policies, which may include an adequate management 
of  donation  interviews  (see  Thorne  (1996,  2006:5.1)  for  an  empirical  estimation  of  the  productivity  of 
exhortation spending). Spain’s low refusal rate accounts for a part of its high relative performance in terms of the 
donor rate, but seemingly not for the main part of it. Comparing, for example, the refusal and donor rates of 
France  and  Spain,  one  can  produce  estimates  of  the  relative  contributions  of  exhortation  policy  (say,  the 
“exhortation  effect”)  and  production  organization  (say,  the  “organization  of  production  effect”)  to  the 
productivity gap between these two countries quite simply as follows: Substituting the French refusal rate (27%) 
for  the  Spanish  one  (15%)  in  Spanish  donation  data  yields  a  Spanish  donor  rate  net  of  the  difference  in 







per  million;  the  latter  implies  relative  contributions  of  the 














.  Similar  calculations  conducted  on  UK  data  yield  similar 
conclusions, namely, an exhortation effect and a production organization effect respectively accounting for 44% 
and 56%  of the productivity gap between Spain and the UK. the marginal productivity of general inputs in any type of production exceeds their marginal self-
crowding impact (assumptions 1-(iv) and 1-(v)). 
 
Assumption 1: (i) For all  { , , } r x y z Î , 
r
i f  is of the type  ( , ) ( , , )
r r x y z
i i i i i i i i t v g t v v v v ® + + , where 
r
i g  is 
continuous and concave in 
3
+ ℝ  and 
2 C  in 
3
++ R . (ii)  ( , , ) 0
r r x y z
i i i i i i g t v v v v + + =  whenever  0
r
i v = . (iii) 
( , , ) 0
x x x y z
i i i i i i g t v v v v + + =  whenever  0 i t = . (iv) 
x
i g  is  0 > , increasing in  i t , totally increasing in 
x
i v , 
and is decreasing in total general input 
x y z
i i i v v v + +  in 
3
++ R  (that is, precisely:  0
x
i g > ,  1 0
x
i g ¶ > , 
2 3 0
x x
i i g g ¶ +¶ >  and   3 0
x
i g ¶ <  in 
3
++ R , where 
x
k i g ¶ denotes the partial derivative of 
x
i g  with respect 
to its k-th argument,  {1,2,3} kÎ ). (v) For all  { , } r y z Î , 
r
i g  is everywhere constant in  i t ; it is  0 > , 
2 C , 
totally increasing in 
r
i v , and decreasing in 
x y z
i i i v v v + +  in 
2
+ ++ ´ R R  (i.e., with the notations above: 
1 0
r
i g ¶ = ;  0
r
i g > ,  2 3 0
r r
i i g g ¶ +¶ >   and  3 0
r
i g ¶ <   in 
2
+ ++ ´ R R ).  (vi)  For  all 
3 ( , ) i i t v + ÎR   and  all 
neighbourhood  V   of  ( , ) i i t v   in 
3
+ R ,  there  exists 
2
i v + Î ɶ R   such  that  ( , ) i i t v V Î ɶ   and  
( , , ) ( , , )
r x y z r x y z
i i i i i i i i i i g t v v v v g t v v v v + + > + + ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ  for all  { , , } r x y z Î . (vii) Hospitals’ production constraints 
are identical, except for the upper bound on graft production, that is, there exists a triple of  functions 
( , , )
x y z g g g  such that, for all i : ( ) ( ) , , , ,
x y z x y z
i i i g g g g g g = .  
 
Assumption 1 is maintained throughout in the sequel. 
Hospitals can purchase any quantity of general inputs 
x y z
i i i v v v + +  on perfectly competitive markets of 
inputs at fixed market price    w . Graft provision is non-profit: It is billed at production cost to the 
transplant agency, which collects transplants and redistributes them to care units free of charge. Each 
hospital  i  finances its general inputs for care services from a fixed budget  B, the same for all  i , 
subject to budget constraint  ( )
x y
i i w v v B + £ . The latter imposes an upper bound  / B w on its aggregate 
consumption  of  general  inputs  for  care  services 
x y
i i v v + .  The  market  price  of  general  inputs  is 
normalized to 1 in the sequel, that is, we let  1 w = , without loss of generality. The  set  of  feasible  alternatives  of  hospital  i   that  deduces  from  the  assumptions  above  reads: 
6 ( , ) {( , , , ) :( , , ) ( , ),  , and  }
x y
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i A t x y z v x y z g t v z v v B w w + = Î £ £ + £ ℝ ,  where  g   denotes  map 
( , ) ( ( , , ), ( , , ), ( , , ))
x x x y z y y x y z z z x y z
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i t v g t v v v v g t v v v v g t v v v v ® + + + + + + . 
The  transplant  agency  is  endowed  with  fixed  budget  0 B ,  sufficient  to  cover  the  cost  of  graft 
production for any feasible  z , that is,  0
z
i i N B v
Î ³∑  for all v  such that  ( , )
z
i i i g t v w £  for all i . Its set 
of  feasible  alternatives  therefore  reads:  0 1 ( ) { ( ,..., ) : }
n
n i i i N i N A z t t t t z + Î Î = = Î £ ∑ ∑ ℝ .  This 
assumption notably implies, realistically enough we believe, that the rationing constraints over organ 
transplantation are entirely driven by technical and endowment limitations: They owe nothing in this 
model, and owe very little in practice, to the financial constraints of the medical care systems of 
developed economies.  
 
3-3-Hospital’s production possibility frontier 
 
All relevant characteristics of hospitals’ constraints can be conveniently summarized in the following 
notion of a production possibility frontier of the hospital, describing the set of hospital’s accessible 
and  technically  efficient  output  combinations  ( , , ) i i i x y z .  The  formal  definition  below  uses  two 
functions  derived  in  the  first  lemma  of  the  appendix  (see  Appendix:  A-1),  namely:  function 
1 ( ) ( )
z
i B i z g z
- ® , which yields the quantity of general inputs required to produce  i z  for any fixed total 
quantity of general inputs available for transplant and other care services 
x y
i i v v B + = ; and function 
( , , ) ( , , ) i i i i i i x z t F x z t ® , which yields the efficient production in general care services  i y  accessible 
from any fixed accessible ( , ) i i x z  and any fixed positive  i t . 
 
Definition  1:  The  production  possibility  frontier  of  hospital  i   is:  set 
3 1 {( , , ) : 0,  (0, , ( ) ( )) and   }
y z
i i i i i B i i i x y z x y g B B g z z w
-
+ Î = = + £ ℝ   if  0 i t = ;  set 
3 1 {( , , ) : ( , , ( ) ( )),  ( , , ) and  }
x z
i i i i i B i i i i i i i x y z x g t B B g z y F x z t z w
-
+ Î £ + = £ ℝ  if  0 i t > . 
 Figures 1a and 1b represent the canonical projection of some production possibility frontier on plane 
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i v  is the quantity of general inputs used in transplant care 
(solving  ( , , )
x x
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0  xi 
 
( ) i i i t z x F , , 1 ¶(=
1 ( ) ( )
z
B i B g z
- + ). It interprets as a technical marginal rate of substitution of general care services for 
transplant care services, that is, the marginal variation (decrease) in the provision of general care 
services  that  is  required  for  maintaining  hospital’s  production  combination  on  the  production 
possibility  frontier,  following  a  marginal  increase  in  the  provision  of  transplant  care  services.  It 
corresponds, geometrically, to the slope of the graph of partial function  ( , , ) i i i i x F x z t ®  in plane 
( , ) i i x y  (see Figure 1b). We name it marginal rate of transformation in the sequel, although it does not 
exactly coincide with usual meaning of the latter notion, to distinguish it from the marginal rate of 
substitution defined from hospitals’ utility function below. 
Another characteristic of hospital technology which reveals analytically indispensable in this model is 
the marginal rate of compensation of transplant provision by transplant transfer, formally defined as 
follows: 
 
Definition 2: Let  0 i t > , and  ( , , ) i i i x y z  be on hospital  i ’s associate production possibility frontier. 




( , , )
( , , )
i i i
i i i
F x z t






Any  increase  in  graft  production  i z   ceteris  paribus  induces  a  downward  shift  of  the  graph  of 
( , , ) i i i i x F x z t ®  in plane ( , ) i i x y , implying a contraction of hospital’s set of accessible production in 
( , ) i i x y , due to the crowding effect exerted on the production of transplant and general care services 
by increased use of general inputs in graft production (see Lemma 1 and Figure 1c). Symmetrically, 
any  increase  in  transplant  transfer  i t   ceteris  paribus  induces  an  upward  shift  of  the  graph  of 
( , , ) i i i i x F x z t ®   in  plane  ( , ) i i x y   (implying  an  expansion  of  hospital’s  set  of  accessible  final 
productions ( , ) i i x y ) by releasing some quantity of general inputs in transplant care provision, which 
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measures the marginal variation (increase) in the transplant transfer 
*
i t (>0) received by hospital i  that 
is required for keeping hospital’s production constant (=
* * * ( , , ) i i i F x z t ), following a marginal increase in 
its graft production from
*
i z . It corresponds, geometrically, to the slope of the level curve through 
* * ( , ) i i z t of partial function 
* ( , ) ( , , ) i i i i i z t F x z t ®  in plane  ( , ) i i z t  (see Figure 1e).
 4 It is determined by 
the  ratio  of  crowding  costs  to  the  marginal  productivity  of  inputs,  increasing  in  the  former.
5  It 
interprets as an indicator of tension on hospital’s production capacities. 
 
Fig 1.c 
                                                 
4  More  formally,  it  follows  from  Lemma  1  and  the  implicit  function  theorem  that  equation 
* * * ( , , ) ( , , ) 0 i i i i i i F x z t F x z t - =  implicitly defines  i t  as a 
2 C  increasing function [ ] 0, i w ++ ® R of  i z , the graph of 
which is the “level curve” of 
* ( , ) ( , , ) i i i i i z t F x z t ® through 
* * ( , ) i i z t in plane ( , ) i i z t . The implicit function theorem 
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 at any point  ( , ) i i z t  of its 
graph. 
5  Calculations  using  the  proof  of  Lemma  1  yield  an  MRC 
3 3 2
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,  which  is 
increasing in  3
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The position of the MRC relative to unity (larger than, equal to, or smaller than 1) is of particular 
importance for the study of equilibrium and social optimum below. To fix ideas, consider the case of a 
hospital that contributes an additional kidney for circulation by the transplant agency ( 1 i dz = + ) and 
simultaneously receives an additional kidney from the agency for its own transplant care services 
( 1 i dt = + ). An MRC  1 >  (resp.  1 = , resp.  1 < ) essentially means that its production possibility frontier 
shifts  downwards  (resp.  is  left  unchanged,  resp.  shifts  upwards)  in  the  plane  of  final  production 
combinations ( , ) i i x y  as a consequence of this marginal change in its pair of contribution and transfer 
( , ) i i z t .  
yi 
xi 
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4-Behavioural assumptions: preferences, interactions and equilibrium 
 
In this section, we first return on one of the basic justifications for the existence of a transplant agency 
collecting and dispatching transplants (4-1). We turn next to the modelling of public good issues 
relative to transplants in the presence of the transplant agency (4-2-1 and 4-2-2), and finally design a 
socially optimal transplant care system (4-3).  
 
4-1-Unregulated equilibrium and the optimal production of transplant care services 
 
Our  basic  behavioural  assumption  is  agent  rationality,  construed  as  the  maximization  of  agents’ 
complete and transitive preferences over their sets of alternatives.  
Hospitals, notably, are viewed as rational agents exclusively concerned with their own provision of 
care services. Hospital  i  maximizes a utility function  u, the same for all  i , over the set of pairs 
( , ) i i x y   of  combinations  of  transplant  and  other  care  services  which  it  performs.  We  make  the 
following set of standard assumptions on utility function, which will be maintained throughout the 
sequel: 
 
Assumption 2: Hospitals’ utility function is a continuous, non-decreasing, quasi-concave function 
over 
2
+ R , whose restriction to 
2
++ R  is a 
2 C , strictly increasing and strictly quasi-concave function.  
Moreover  ( , ) (0) i i u x y u > implies ( , ) 0 i i x y ≫ .
6 
                                                 
6 Note that the boundary condition of Assumption 2, which may interpret as a priority of the final production of 
care services, is incompatible with for-profit behaviour. Assumption 2 can be made compatible with for-profit 
behaviour for production plans that are sufficiently far from the lower boundary of hospital’s production set by 
relaxing the strict quasi-concavity in 
2
++ R  to simple quasi-concavity. Strict quasi-concavity is used in the sequel 
only for the technically convenient uniqueness of hospital’s optimum final production plan that it implies. It can 
be replaced, with the same consequence and without substantial differences for subsequent analysis, by the 
alternative assumption of a quasi-concave utility function and production functions 
x g  and 
y g  strictly concave 
in 
3
++ R . In other words, the main of subsequent analysis applies to the case of for-profit behaviour of care 
production units when equilibrium conditions imply an optimal production plan of the hospital that is sufficiently 
far from the axes. 
  
In the absence of a market for transplant inputs, banned by law, and of any institutional substitute for 
the former such as a transplant agency, hospitals would be reduced to a situation of autarky, as far as 
transplant inputs are concerned, that is, produce by themselves, from their own endowment  i w  and 
budget  i B , the grafts they use in their final production of transplant care services. Formally, each 
hospital  would  solve  program  max{ ( , ):( , , , , ) 0, i i i i i i i u x y x y z v t ³  
( , , ) ( , ),  , and  }
x y z
i i i i i i i i i i i x y z g t v t z v v v B w £ £ £ + + £ , where hospital’s budget covers all expenses in 
general  inputs,  including  the  general  inputs 
z
i v   used  in  intermediary  graft  production  (hospital’s 
“autarkic” budget constraint). A production equilibrium of this autarkic transplant care system would 
then consist of an input-output combination of the care system ( , , , , ) x y z v t  solving simultaneously the 
n independent programs of the hospitals. We name this type of equilibrium an autarkic equilibrium. 
Common sense suggests that such unregulated equilibrium can very easily result in the waste of a part 
of total graft resources, that is, typically, in this highly aggregated model
7, disposal, by best endowed 
hospitals, of the fraction of their endowment that exceeds the quantity of graft inputs they need for the 
provision of transplant care services that maximizes their utility in program above. Formally: 
 
Theorem  1:  There  exists  a  solution 
* * * * * ( , , , , ) i i i i i x y z v t   of  the  “unconstrained”  autarkic  program 
max{ ( , ):( , , , , ) 0,( , , ) ( , ), ,and  }
x y z
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i u x y x y z v t x y z g t v t z v v v B ³ £ £ + + £ , that is, of hospital’s 
autarkic program where the rationing constraint over graft production  i i z w £  has been dropped. This 
solution  is  the  same  for  all  i ,  unique  with  respect  to 
* * ( , ) i i x y ,  and  0 ≫ .  If  there  exists 
* { : } i i i N w w Î Î   such  that 
* * * * * ( , , , , ) i i i i i x y z v t   verifies  rationing  constraint 
*
i i z w <   with  a  strict 
inequality, then, for all hospitals  j such that 
*
j i w w ³ : 
* * * * * ( , , , , ) i i i i i x y z v t  is an autarkic equilibrium 
input-output combination of hospital  j; and hospital  j’s marginal utility of graft resource 
*
i w  is null 
                                                 
7 In a more accurate description of the medical care system, the problem under consideration here would be, 
realistically,  formulated  as  mismatched  vectors  of  potential  graft  resources  (kidneys,  corneas,…)  and    final 
transplant care services of the hospital at any moment in time. For an application of matching models and 
discrete optimization techniques to the health care system and the economics of transplants, see Alvin Roth et 
alii (2004, 2005ab and 2006). at 
* * * * * ( , , , , ) i i i i i x y z v t .  Moreover,  hospitals’  autarkic  budget  constraints 
x y z
i i i v v v B + + £   are  always 
binding (that is, satiated, with positive hospitals’ marginal utilities of budget) at autarkic equilibrium. 
 
The proof of this theorem, as those of most of the following, is detailed in the appendix (see A-2). 
Only one very short proof will be presented in the present section (Theorem 3). 
The disposal of a part of the resources of the hospitals that are best endowed in terms of their potential 
of graft production will very commonly appear as a social waste if there exists a possibility of making 
a productive use of disposed resources in some other hospitals, in terms of their final production of 
care  services.  Hospitals’  endowments  in  the  sense  above  (potential  of  graft  production)  being 
physically  and  legally  non-transferable,  the  notion  of  social  optimum  implicit  in  this  normative 
appreciation of “wasteful” disposal actually refers to implicit social preferences over pairs  ( , ) x y of 
final production of the care system.
8 We now introduce such preferences explicitly, with the following 
basic  normative  priors,  summarized  in  Assumption  3  below:  The  social  preferences  aggregate 
hospitals’ preferences, are increasing in both types of final production of care services, express (like 
hospitals’)  a  priority  of  production, and imply  a  preference  for  an “equal treatment  of relevantly 
equals”, that is, a preference for equal provision of final care services over hospitals whenever the 
latter is accessible.  
 
Assumption  3:  The  social  utility  function  is  a  continuous,  non-decreasing,  anonymous
9  function 
:
n W + + ® R R , whose restriction to 
n
++ R  is a 
2 C , strictly increasing function 
n
++ ++ ® R R .  Moreover 
                                                 
8 Brain-dead patients cannot be physically transferred from one hospital to another mainly because of imperative 
legal constraints. In particular, lump-sum transfers of hospitals’ graft endowments cannot be used as instruments 
of a public distribution policy in this context. Grafts are physically transferable between hospitals, subject to the 
legal constraints of the national transplant organization, but they must be extracted on site, due to the reason 
above.  Distribution  w   cannot  be  an  object  of  individual  or  social  preference  in  our  context  (if  preference 
underlies choice, as is assumed here, naturally). Graft production  z  is individually or socially valuable only as 
an intermediary for the final production of transplant care services  x . Final production of care services seems, 
therefore, to be the most appropriate object of preferences, both at individual and at social level, in this model of 
the medical care system. 
9 The anonymity property states that any permutation in hospitals’ names (and associate production  ( , ) i i x y ) 
leaves the agency’s utility unchanged. 1 1 ( , ) ( ( , ),..., ( , )) n n x y W u x y u x y ®   is  strictly  quasi-concave  in 
2n
++ R ,  and  such  that 
1 1 ( ( , ),..., ( , )) ( (0),..., (0)) n n W u x y u x y W u u >  implies  ( , ) (0) i i u x y u >  for all i .  
 
The utilitarian sum of hospitals’ utility functions  :( , ) ( , ) i i i N i N u x y u x y
Î Î ® ∑ ∑  yields an example of 
a social utility function that verifies Assumption 3.  Assumption 3 is maintained throughout the sequel. 
We can now introduce, as formal Definitions 3 and 4 below, two derived notions that will prove useful 
for the normative appreciation of production equilibrium, namely, the socially efficient production of 
final care services of the medical care system (in short, social optimum), and the social scarcity of 
(potential) graft resources. 
 
Definition 3: A final production combination  ( , ) x y  of the medical care system, or associate input-
output combination  ( , , , , ) x y z v t , is socially efficient if it maximizes the social utility function W  in 
the  set  of  socially  accessible  input-output  combinations 
7 {( , , , , ) : ;    ;  ;  and ( , , ) ( , ) for
n x y
i i i i i i i i i i N i N i N x y z v t t z z v v nB x y z g t v w + Î Î Î Î £ £ + £ £ ∑ ∑ ∑ ℝ  all i}.
10 
 
Definition  4:  The  potential  graft  resources  of  hospital  i   are  socially  scarce  if  a  ceteris  paribus 
increase  in  this  hospital’s  endowment  increases  optimal  social  utility,  that  is,  if 
1 1 max{ ( ( , ),..., ( , )):( , , , , ) 0; ;  '; ;and ( , , )
x y
n n i i i i i i i i N i N i N W u x y u x y x y z v t t z z v v nB x y z w
Î Î Î ³ £ £ + £ ∑ ∑ ∑
( , )  } i i g t v i £ " > 1 1 max{ ( ( , ),..., ( , )):( , , , , ) 0; ; ';
x y
n n i i i i i N i N i N W u x y u x y x y z v t t z z v v w
Î Î Î ³ £ £ + £ ∑ ∑ ∑
;and ( , , ) ( , )  } i i i i i nB x y z g t v i £ "  whenever  'i i w w >  and  / / ' = n i n i w w .  
 
The next proposition and corollary characterize social optimum and scarcity. 
 
                                                 
10 Note that the specification of the social opportunity set implied by this definition of the social optimum 
supposes, as already stated at the end of 3-2 above, that the constraints binding the production of final transplant 
care services, if any, are the rationing constraints over graft production, as opposed to the budget constraints 
limiting purchases of general inputs.  Theorem  2:  There  exist  social  optima 
* * * * * ( , , , , ) x y z v t ,  which  are  0 ≫ ,  with  a  unique  optimal 
production of final care services 
* * ( , ) x y , and verify the following system of necessary and sufficient 
first-order conditions, where partial derivatives are evaluated at the optimum: (i) 
* *  i i i N i N t z
Î Î = ∑ ∑ ; 
(ii) 
* * x y
i i i Nv v nB
Î + = ∑ ; (iii) for all  i , 











* z w £  and there 
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n l d ++ + Î ´ R R  such that  1 1 . .
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* .( ) 0 i i i z d w - =  for all i , where l  and  i d  are the marginal social utilities of aggregate hospitals’ 
contribution and hospital  i ’s potential graft resources respectively. The potential graft resources of 
hospital i  are scarce at social optimum if and only if  i d  is  0 > . 
 
Corollary 1: 
* * * * ( , , , ) x y z t  is socially optimal if and only if: (i) 
* *  i i i N i N t z
Î Î = ∑ ∑ ; (ii) for all  i , 
* * * * ( , , ) i i i i y F x z t =  and 
* *
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,  and 
* .( ) 0 i i i z d w - = ,  where  the 
partial derivatives are evaluated at the optimum. Hospital  i ’s potential graft resources are scarce at 
social optimum if and only if this hospital’s MRC is  1 <  at the optimum. 
 
Corollary 1 does not require an explicit proof, as simple consequence of Theorem 2 and Lemma 1. 
The proof of Theorem 2 is detailed in the appendix (A-2).  
To sum up, in a context of scarcity of transplant and general inputs of the health system, and in the 
absence of a market for the former, socially optimal provision of transplant care services should be 
limited by hospital’s rationing constraints  i i z w £ , implying  z w =  at social optimum, while autarkic 
provision should be limited by hospitals’ autarkic budget constraints 
x y z
i i i v v v B + + £ , at least for 
those hospitals that are best endowed in terms of their potential graft resources, implying the waste of 
a fraction of the latter, that is, a socially inefficient (under-) provision of transplants (both intermediary and  final).  This  yields  the  basic  rationale,  within  our  abstract  representation  of  the  medical  care 
system, for the introduction of a transplant agency in charge of collecting and circulating grafts in the 
place of the missing market for transplant inputs.  
 
4-2-Regulated equilibrium with public good interactions 
 
We suppose, from there on, that there exists a transplant agency of the type described at the beginning 
of this section, and moreover assume that this agency endorses the social preferences of Assumption 3. 
As  noted  above,  the  existence  of  a  transplant  agency  induces  public  good  externalities  of  the 
technological type between hospitals, as long as the latter control their production of grafts, that is: 
The graft production decided by any hospital has consequences on the production sets of all others 
through transplant redistribution by the agency. 
Public good interactions between hospitals and the agency are modelled below through a device which 
has become standard in mechanism design theory, namely, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of two-
stage games (see notably, in the context of models of private contributions to a public good, Guttman 
(1978, 1987), Bergstrom (1989) or Cornes and Silva (1999) and also the detailed references reviewed 
in Mercier Ythier (2006: 6.3 and A.2.1)). We successively consider three possible variants of the two-
stage game, where hospitals and the agency alternate as first and second players in the game. The first 
two are defined below as the myopic game (4-2-1) and the clear-sighted game (4-2-2) respectively. 




In  the  first  variant  of  the  two-stage  game,  hospitals  play  second,  each  one  solving 
max{ ( , ):( , , , ) ( , )} i i i i i i i i i u x y x y z v A t w Î  with respect to  ( , , , ) i i i i x y z v  for any given  i t . We denote by 
i j   hospital  i ’s  reaction  correspondence  at  this  stage,  defined  by 
( ) argmax{ ( , ):( , , , ) ( , )} i i i i i i i i i i t u x y x y z v A t j w = Î , and let  1 ( ,..., ) n j j j = . The transplant agency plays in the first stage of the game, solving   1 1 0 max{ ( ( , ),..., ( , )):( , , , ) ( ) and  ( )} n n W u x y u x y x y z v t t A z j Î Î  
with respect to t . An equilibrium of the game is a state ( , , , , ) x y z v t  that solves the latter program. We 
refer to this first notion of equilibrium as the myopic equilibrium in the sequel, due to the short-sighted 
free-riding behaviour of hospitals which it implies. 
We have the following simple benchmark property for the myopic equilibrium: 
 
Theorem 3: The provision of transplant care services and grafts is null at myopic equilibrium. 
 
Proof: Graft production is costly for the hospital, due to its crowding effects on hospital’s production 
of final care services  ( , ) i i x y , and doesn’t yield any advantage, ceteris paribus (that is, given others’ 
graft provision and agency’s transfers), in terms of hospital’s utility. Therefore  0 z = , which implies 
0 t = , which implies in turn  0 x = .■
11 
 
The above result is interesting as a clear-cut, albeit extreme expression of the coordination problem of 
transplant activities. It is individually rational for myopic hospitals to free ride, or shirk, on graft 
production, that is, to attempt to shift over the others the crowding costs induced by graft production
12. 
Myopia interprets as a lack of understanding, at individual level, of the collective damages that result 
from generalized free-riding, namely, the dramatic under-provision of transplants (no provision at all, 
in  the  case  under  consideration).  The  existence  of  a  central  agency  collecting  and  redistributing 
transplants  is  not  only  insufficient,  per  se,  for  solving  the  public  good  problem;  it  dramatically 
                                                 
11  The  set  of  myopic  equilibria  is 
7 {( , , , , ) : 0;  =0,   /  and 0
n z x y
i i i i x y z v t x z t v v v B w y + Î = = = + £ £ £ R  
(0, , ) for all  }
y y x y
i i i g v v v i + , implying  an equilibrium utility of hospitals and the agency everywhere equal to 
their minimal values in their respective domains, that is  (0) u  and  ( (0),..., (0)) W u u  respectively.  
12 Note that the formulation of the public good problem as a pure coordination problem here and below does not 
rely on imperfect or costly information. The reason for this is empirical: accounts of the Spanish and other 
experiences  of  national  transplant  systems  we  are  aware  of  put  little  emphasis,  if  any  emphasis  at  all,  on 
information problems per se. The main difficulty, as far as production units are concerned, seems to be self-
centredness, understood as the propensity of each hospital to concentrate on its own patients, and subsequent 
reluctance to consider costly actions that are not directly related to this priority. One of the main lessons of the 
Spanish experience, it seems to us, is that most problems are solved by simply discharging hospitals, in some 
appropriate way, of the concern of on site organization of graft production (including identification of potential 
donors, and donations interviews).  
 deteriorates production equilibrium, relative to the autarkic equilibrium, if public good interactions are 




The  consequence  of Theorem  3  is  too  extreme  to be  accepted  literally.  Hospitals  should  be,  and 
actually are well aware of the damages of shirking (in the sense of footnote 
11) for the medical care 
system as a whole, and for themselves as a part of it. Myopia does not appear a realistic assumption, in 
other words, both a priori and in view of its logical implication.  
In  the  variant  of  the  two-stage  game  that  we  introduce  now,  the  agency  plays  second,  solving  
1 1 0 max{ ( ( , ),..., ( , )):( , , , ) ( , ) for all  , and  ( )} n n i i i i i i i W u x y u x y x y z v A t i t A z w Î Î   with  respect  to 
( , , , ) x y v t  for any given  z w £ . We denote by 
0 0 0
1 ( ,..., ) n j j j =  the agency’s transfer correspondence 
at this stage, where 
0
i j  yields the agency’s optimal transfers to hospital i  for any fixed  z . Hospitals 
play  first,  each  one  solving  max{ ( , ): i i u x y  
0 ( , , , ) ( , ); ( )} i i i i i i i i i x y z v A t t z w j Î Î   with  respect  to 
( , , , ) i i i i x y z v  for any given vector of graft production of other hospitals  / n i z . An equilibrium of the 
game is a Nash non-cooperative equilibrium of the first-stage game, that is, a state 
* * * * * ( , , , , ) x y z v t  
such  that: 
* 0 * ( ) t z j Î ;  and  for  all  i , 
* * * * ( , , , ) i i i i x y z v   solves 
0 *
/ max{ ( , ):( , , , ) ( , ); (( , ))} i i i i i i i i i i i n i i u x y x y z v A t t z z w j Î Î . We name it the clear-sighted equilibrium in 
the sequel, because it embodies hospitals’ clear awareness of the public good externality associated 
with graft production, and individual damages from free-riding behaviour that it implies for them. 
We establish below that clear-sightedness, if it actually improves the functioning of the transplant care 
system relative to the myopic game, by implying a positive production of grafts and transplant services 
(Theorem 4-(i)), nevertheless does not suffice for solving the under-provision problem. Precisely, it is 
shown that a fraction of the system’s resources for graft production remains unexploited, in general, at 
clear-sighted equilibrium when graft resources are socially scarce (Theorem 4-(ii)).  We restrict attention, in this subsection, to the medical care systems that have clear-sighted equilibria. 
The existence property of clear-sighted equilibrium is analyzed in detail in the appendix (A-4). It is 
shown there (Lemma 5) that the critical feature which conditions existence is that hospitals’ first-stage 
reaction  correspondences  be  convex-valued.  A  minimal  sufficient  condition  on  preferences  and 
technology  for  the  latter  is  that  the  first-stage  reduced  form  of  hospitals’  utility  functions 
( , ) ( , ( , , ( )) i i i i i i x z u x F x z z j ®  be quasi-concave (A-4: Lemma 4). Formally: 
 
Definition 5: The medical care system ( , , , ) W u g w  is convex if, for all i , the first-stage reduced form 
of  hospital  i ’s  utility  function 
*
/ ( , ) ( , ( , , (( , ))) i i i i i i n i i x z u x F x z z z j ®   is  quasi-concave  over 
2 {( , ) :0 } i i i i x z z w + Î < £ R   for  all 
* { : }
n z z z w + Î Î £ R   and  quasi-concave  over 
2 {( , ) :0 } i i i i x z z w + Î £ £ R  for all 
*
/ { : ;0 }
n
n i z z z z w + Î Î £ < R .  
 
Theorem 4: Let ( , , , ) W u g w  be convex. (i) Clear-sighted equilibria exist and are  0 ≫ . (ii) Transplant 
care services are underprovided, in general, at clear-sighted equilibrium (that is, equilibrium graft 
production is  w < ) when hospitals’ graft resources are all scarce at social optimum. (iii) Clear-sighted 
equilibrium is a social optimum notably if programs  max{ ( , ( , , )): } i i i i i i u x F x z z z w £  yield a same 
solution ( , ) i i x z  for all hospitals.  
 
The details of the proof are given in the appendix (A-5). We concentrate here on the essence of the 
argument underlying the second and third parts of the theorem, beginning with the optimality property 
of the latter. 
The first-order conditions characterizing social optimum (Corollary 1) and clear-sighted equilibrium 
(Lemmas 2 and 3) differ on a single essential point, namely, hospitals’ marginal utilities of graft 
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 for social equilibrium
13. The transfer policy 
0 j  of the transplant agency will therefore completely 
solve the coordination problem of the care system, that is, make hospitals’ equilibrium and optimum 
evaluation of graft resources coincide in all circumstances if, and in general only if 
0( ) 1 i i z j ¶ =  for all 
i  and all  z , that is, if 
0 j  is the identity function  z z ®  of 
n R . The latter transfer policy consists of 
returning each hospital its contribution in all circumstances. 
Clearly enough, this perfect or complete solution to the coordination problem should, in general, 
conflict with the end-objectives of allocation efficiency and distribution equity implied by the social 
preference relation. In other words, returning each hospital its contribution in all circumstances is 
generally not an optimal transfer policy of the transplant agency at the second stage of the clear-
sighted game. The main first-order conditions for the latter are  2 3 . . iW u F l ¶ ¶ ¶ = , equating marginal 
social utilities of transfers to the marginal social utility of hospitals’ aggregate contribution
14. The 
anonymity  and  convexity  properties  of  the  social  preference  relation  (Assumption  3)  imply  that 
marginal social utilities  iW ¶  are identical if and only if hospitals’ utilities are identical (and  (0) u > ). 
The identity function  z z ®  solves, therefore, the agency’s second-stage problem if, and in general 
only  if  the  following  two  conditions  hold:  (i)  a  constant  function  3 ( , , ) i i i i z F x z z ®¶ ;  (ii)  and  
hospital’s first-stage reduced form programs  max{ ( , ( , , )): } i i i i i i u x F x z z z w £  yielding a same solution 
( , ) i i x z  for all hospitals.  
Condition (ii) above interprets as follows: Hospitals, producing their transplant care services from 
their own production of transplant inputs, and financing their purchases of general inputs for their 
intermediary graft production from the agency’s budget, choose the same production combination 
* * * ( , ( , , ), ) ( , , ) i i i i i x F x z z z x y z =   in  their  individual  opportunity  sets.  In  terms  of  the  rationing 
                                                 
13 The other difference lies in the specification of budget constraints, namely, aggregate budget constraint at 
social optimum versus individual budget constraints at equilibrium. We assume implicitly here and explicitly in 
the  case  of  the  monitored  equilibrium  studied  in  the  next  subsection  that  social  optimum  is  always 
decentralizable, in the sense that if an input-output combination of the care system can be achieved from its 
aggregate budget, then it can also be achieved from the set of hospitals’ individual budgets. This assumption is 
not much demanding in our setup, since hospitals are assumed identical in all respects except potential graft 
endowment and social optimum verifies hospitals’ rationing constraints by definition.  
14 The other conditions that are relevant for allocation efficiency are the first-order conditions equating hospitals’ 
marginal rates of substitution with their marginal rates of transformation. This set of conditions is automatically 
verified, in a decentralized way, at the solutions of hospitals’ first-stage programs of the clear-sighted game. constraints over graft production, this type of configuration is compatible with only two possibilities: 
either none of these constraints are binding; or all hospitals’ endowments are equal, if a constraint is 
binding  for  some  hospital  (that  is,  satiated,  with  positive  associate  hospitals’  marginal  utility  of 
endowment). We establish in the appendix the intuitively clear fact that, in such cases, status quo 
transfers 
0 * * ( . ) . n n z e z e j =  are equilibrium transfers, and that 
* * * ( . , . , . ) n n n x e y e z e  is a socially efficient 
clear-sighted  equilibrium  production  combination  for  such  transfers.  Example  2  below  yields  an 
instance of a calculable care system with constant unitary MRC where the optimality property of 
Theorem 4-(iii) applies and status quo is the agency’s transfer policy. 
To sum up, the agency’s end-objectives of allocation efficiency and distribution equity should conflict 
with coordination objectives in most circumstances, the only notable exception corresponding to the 
case where hospitals spontaneously achieve social optimum because rationing constraints are either 
non-binding or identical for all of them. In realistic circumstances, where rationing constraints are 
binding at social optimum and there is some diversity in hospitals’ endowments, the status quo transfer 
policy which consists of returning each hospital its contribution cannot be an optimal policy (that is, 
cannot yield equal social marginal utilities of transfers for all hospitals), at social optimum and in the 
close neighbourhood, for anonymous, increasing, strictly convex social preferences.  The agency’s 
transfer  policy  is  therefore  bound  to  introduce  some  discrepancies  between  hospitals’  marginal 
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), through hospitals’ marginal returns of 
individual contribution 
0
i i j ¶  distinct from 1.  
In the practically relevant case where graft resources are scarce at social optimum (that is,  marginal 









 for all  i  at social optimum, implying  that socially optimal graft 
production is  z w = ) social optimum is not a clear-sighted equilibrium if and only if the marginal 











 for some  i , implying that hospital  i  then wants to deviate from socially optimal  i i z w =  by diminishing its contribution. In Example 1 below, we present a family of calculable 
care systems, with symmetric log-linear utility function of hospitals, additive utilitarian social utility 
function,  and  square  root  Cobb-Douglas  production  functions,  where  the  agency’s  second-stage 
optimal  transfer  policy  turns  out  to  be  the  equal  sharing  of  aggregate  contribution,  that  is,   
0 1
( ) i i i N z z
n
j
Î = ∑   for  all  i   for  all  z .  Hospitals’  marginal  return  of  own  contribution   
0( ) i z j ¶  
therefore is equal to 1/ n  in the example, hence smaller than 1 if there is more than one hospital and 
decreasing to 0 as hospitals’ number grows to infinity. We show that the Nash equilibrium of the first 
stage  of  the  clear-sighted  game,  which  coincides  by  definition  with  clear-sighted  equilibrium  for 
agency’s  optimal  policy  above,  reduces  to  an  example  of  the  general  class  of  symmetric  Nash 
equilibrium with public goods of Chamberlin (1974)
15 when hospitals’ number is sufficiently large. In 
particular: hospitals’ individual contribution is positive, decreasing in hospitals’ number, and tends 
asymptotically  to  0  as  the  latter  grows  to  infinity;  hospitals’  aggregate  contribution  increases  in 
hospitals’ number, at a lower speed than the latter. This notably implies that no rationing constraint is 
binding in first-stage hospitals’ programs, and that clear-sighted equilibrium is therefore independent 
of the initial distribution of potential graft resources, when the number of hospitals is sufficiently 
large. Moreover, we show that graft resources are scarce at social optimum, whatever the number of 
hospitals, for suitable equal distributions of potential graft resources. Transfers actually practiced by 
transplant agencies certainly are much closer to equal sharing policy 
1
i i N z z
n
Î ® ∑  than to status quo 
policy  z z ® , so that hospitals’ marginal returns of contribution 
0( ) i z j ¶  should be considered much 
closer to 1/ n  than to 1 in reality, hence much closer to 0 than to 1 in view of actual numbers of care 
production units in charge of providing the transplant care services (155 in the case of Spain, for 
example: see section 2 above). Inefficient under-provision therefore seems a more plausible outcome 
of  the  clear-sighted  game,  for  realistic  assumptions  on  preferences,  technology  and  number  of 
production units. 
                                                 
15 See also the generalizations and extensions of Chamberlin’s result by Andreoni (1988) and Fries et alii (1991), 
and the related literature reviewed in Mercier Ythier (2006: 6.2) Theorem 4-(iii) is a rotten kid theorem (Becker (1974, 1981)). Precisely, it identifies configurations of 
principal-agent interactions where the optimal transfer policy of the (benevolent) principal drives the 
(non-cooperative,  self-centred)  agents  to  implement  a  social  optimum  which  coincides  with  the 
principal’s optimum. The conditions under which this property obtains in this model of the transplant 
care system are quite different from Becker’s (1974, 1981), Bergstrom’s (1989) and also from Cornes 
and Silva’s (1999).   
The public good externalities of first-stage equilibrium pre-exist to transfer policy in the game of 
Cornes and Silva. This and the neutrality property of transfers allow the principal to use transfer policy 
as a pure coordination device in their setup: in the absence of any trade off between allocation and 
distribution  objectives  (due  to  neutrality),  the  principal’s  optimal  transfer  policy  achieves  social 
optimum by equating individual marginal valuations of the public and private goods at first-stage 
equilibrium with their marginal valuations at social optimum. The public good externalities of the 
first-stage equilibrium of the transplant care game, if any, are, by contrast, generated by the principal’s 
transfer policy (as in Becker’s and Bergstrom’s game); moreover, transfer policy induces public good 
externalities if and only if it is not of the status quo type, that is, if and only if it does not merely 
consist of returning each agent its contribution. Only if status quo is the agency’s optimal transfer 
policy  can  the  mechanism  of  Cornes  and  Silva  be  successfully  replicated  in  the  context  of  the 
transplant care game, that is, use transfer policy as a pure coordination device for achieving social 
optimum.  Theorem  4-(iii)  gives  the  sufficient,  and  in  general  necessary,  condition  for  status  quo 
transfer policy to be the agency’s second-stage optimal policy. 
Bergstrom (1989) states that the rotten kid theorem applies if, and in general only if, agents’ utilities 
are conditionally transferable. Bergstrom’s general property, like Becker’s original theorem, do not 
apply to the transplant care game if rationing constraints are binding at social optimum. Becker’s 
theorem  applies  in  the  context  of  competitive  market  exchange,  essentially  because  (perfect) 
competitive  exchange  automatically  achieves  allocation  efficiency  for  any  distribution  of  money 
income, thereby allowing the principal to optimize the sole distribution of income, by means of lump-
sum endowment (or numeraire) transfers (see the Hick’s composite theorem in Bergstrom (1989), and 
also the Example 2 of Mercier Ythier (2007)). The rotten kid property still obtains outside competitive market exchange if the allocation efficiency frontier is invariant to redistribution and if the principal 
can  freely  redistribute  aggregate  money  income  between  self-centred  agents  (Bergstrom  (1989): 
Proposition 1).  None of these conditions apply to the transplant care game, except in the special case 
where rationing constraints are non-binding at equilibrium (see the argument of footnote 
16 and  the 
proof of Theorem 4-(iii) in the appendix). Moreover, the ban on markets of transplant inputs, which 
makes competitive markets fail in the transplant economy, also is the main explanation, both in theory 
and in practice, for the existence of binding rationing constraints in the production of transplant care 
services.  The  virtuous  rotten  kids  of  Becker’s  theorem  are,  so  to  speak,  daughters  and  sons  of 
abundance.  
 
Example 1: A calculated example of Olson-Chamberlin underprovision 
We study the following calculable medical care system  ( , , , ) W u g w : production functions are the 
concave Cobb-Douglas of 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 ( , ) ( ) (( ) ,( ) ,( ) )
x y z x y z
i i i i i i i i i g t v v v v t v v v
-
= + + ; hospitals’ utility function is 
the  log  linear  ( , ) log log i i i i u x y x y = + ;  social  utility  function  is  the  utilitarian  sum 
                                                 
16 Transferable utility translates as follows into our framework: The preference relation underlying hospitals’ 
(identical)  reduced  form  utility  functions  ( , ( , , )) i i i i u x F x z t   admits  a  utility  representation  of  the  type 
. ( , ) i i i At C x z + , where  A is a  0 >  real number and  C  is a real-valued function decreasing in  i z . Suppose for 
simplicity  (without  significant  loss  of  generality  by  Mas-Colell  (1985):  2.3.11)  that 
( , ( , , )) . ( , ) i i i i i i i u x F x z t At C x z = +  for all  i . This implies  2 3 2 2 2 3 2 / ( . )/( . ) / F F u F u F C A ¶ ¶ = ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ = ¶ , where the 
points of evaluation of partial derivatives are omitted to alleviate notations. Denoting by  i u  a utility level of 
hospitali ,  the  utility  possibility  set  conditional  on  the  system  of  agents’  actions    ( , ) x z   is  the  simplex 
1 1 1 {( ,..., ) ( ( , ),..., ( , )): n n n u u C x z C x z ³   . ( , )} i i i i i N i N i N u A z C x z
Î Î Î £ + ∑ ∑ ∑ . The rotten kid theorem implies the 
maximization of “social income”  . ( , ) i i i i N i N A z C x z
Î Î + ∑ ∑  relative to socially accessible agents’ actions  ( , ) x z  
at equilibrium. The f.o.c. for a maximum of  . ( , ) i i i i N i N A z C x z
Î Î + ∑ ∑  such that  0 x ≫  subject to rationing 
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 for all i , and therefore coincide 
with the f.o.c. for the solutions of  max{ ( , ( , , )): } i i i i i i u x F x z z z w £  with positive  i x . Supposing an anonymous 
utility function of the principal, this set of conditions characterize a socially optimal clear-sighted equilibrium, 
with  status  quo  second-stage  optimal  transfer  policy 
0 : z z j ® ,  if  and  only  if  programs 
max{ ( , ( , , )): } i i i i i i u x F x z z z w £  have a same solution, that is, if and only if rationing constraints are either non-
binding in all these programs or identical in all of them (the latter implying identical hospitals’ endowments). In 
particular,  Proposition  1  of  Bergstrom  (1989)  does  not  apply  if,  and  in  general  only  if,  distinct  rationing 
constraints are binding in at least two of these programs. The assumption of Bergstrom’s proposition that fails to 
hold,  in  general,  in  the  latter  case  is  that  the  principal  can  choose  any  vector  of  transfers  in  set 
{ : }
n
i i i N i N t t z + Î Î Î £ ∑ ∑ R , implying that the principal’s transfers are not limited by rationing constraints in the 
cases covered by the proposition.■  1 1 1 ( ( , ),..., ( , )) ( , ) n n n i i i N W u x y u x y u x y




2 ( , , ) 1
i
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i
x
F x z t z
t
 
= - -  
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.  The  first-order  conditions  of  Lemma  2  then  yield 
0( ) (1/ ) i i i N z n z j
Î = ∑  for all  i , that is, the agency’s optimal distribution policy is equal sharing of 
aggregate  hospitals’  contribution.
17  Substituting  optimal  transfer 
0( ) i z j   for  i t   in  F   yields  the 
following  reduced  form  for  hospital  i ’s  first  stage  objective  function: 
2
0 2 ( , ( , , ( ))) log (1/ 2)log 1
i
i i i i i i
j j N
x





  = + - -
 
  ∑
,  viewed  as  a  function  of  ( , ) i i x z   for 
fixed  / n i z .  The  path  of  hospital  i ’s  optimal  final  production  conditional  on  i z   is 
1 1
2 2 2 2 1 1
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. By further restricting to this path the objective function above, 
we  get  the  following  final  reduced  form  for  hospital  i ’s  first  stage  program 
2 max{(1/ 2)log log(1 ) (1/ 2)log log2:0 } j i i i j N z z n z w
Î + - - - £ £ ∑ , where the objective function is 
(differentiably)  strictly  concave.  Let  us  provisionally  ignore  the  rationing  constraint  in  the  latter 
program.  The  first-order  necessary  and  sufficient  condition  for  an  unconstrained  maximum  reads 
2
: 5 4( ) 1 0 i j i j N j i z z z
Î ¹ + - = ∑ .  Solving  for  i z   yields  the  unique  0 >   solution 
( )
2
: : (2/5) (1/5) 5 4 i j j j N j i j N j i z z z
Î ¹ Î ¹ = - + + ∑ ∑ . Letting 
*
i z z =  for all i  in the solution and solving 
for 







. In particular, there exists  0 n  such 
that 
*. n z e w ≪  for all  0 n n ³ , implying that 
* z  is a symmetric equilibrium contribution of the medical 
care system, with non-binding rationing constraints, when the number of hospitals is at least as large 
as  0 n . This is then the unique equilibrium contribution, as a special case of Cornes and Hartley, 
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=   for  all  i ;  substituting  into  f.o.c. 
2 3 ( , ( , , )). ( , , ) i i i i i i i u x F x z t F x z t l ¶ ¶ =   and  adding  up  over  i   then  yields  both  2 / j j N n z l
Î = ∑   and 
(1/ ) i j j N t n z
Î = ∑ .  2007.
18  Equilibrium    individual  contribution  lies  in  ] [ 0,1   for  all  0 n n ³ .  It  is  decreasing, 
asymptotically equivalent to 
1
2 n
, converging to 0 as the number of hospitals grows to infinity, while 







+ ∑   is  increasing,  growing  to  infinity  with  the 
number of hospitals but at a lower speed than the latter.
19 One verifies easily from the first-order 
conditions of Theorem 2 that these equilibria are socially inefficient. The marginal social utility of 
hospitals’  aggregate  contribution  is 







,  and  the  marginal  social  utility  of  hospital  i ’s 


















 for all 
i  in the latter yields positive values of  i d  for all  2 n ³ , which are inconsistent with social optimality 






 for all  i  then). Suppose, finally, that initial endowments are equally 
distributed, that is,  . n e w w = ɶ  for some  w ++ Î ɶ R  for all  n . The MRC at  ( , , ) 0 i i i x z t ≫  is 
2 2 ( / ) i i i z t x . 
On the path of hospital  i ’s optimal final production conditional on  i z , and for agency’s optimal 
                                                 
18 The reader can check this by proceeding to the following change of variable: Let the utility function in the 
framework  of  Cornes  et  alii  be 
2 ( , ) log( 2 ) (1/2)log (1/2)log log2 i i i j j N U x G x x g n
Î = - + + +- - ∑ ,  where 
i x denotes  their  “private  good”  (not  to  be  confused  with  our  “provision  of  transplant  care  services”), 
j j N G g
Î =∑ is the public good, and  j g  is  j ’s individual contribution to  G . Let their agent’s endowment (not 
to be confused with our “potential of graft production”) be  1 = . Their reduced utility function, obtained by 
substituting  budget  constraint  1 i i x g + =   in  the  former,  is  (1 , ) i i i U g g G- - + =  
2 log(1 ) (1/2)log( ) (1/2)log log2 i i i g g G n - - + + +- - , where 
: i j j N j i G g - Î ¹ =∑ , which is identical to the reduced 
form  of  the  utility  function  of  our  calculated  example.  A  simple  calculation  shows  that  function 
(1 , ) i i i U g g G- - +  verifies the normality condition of Chamberlin (1974), which implies in turn the condition for 





 is asymptotically equivalent to 
1
2








, which is positive 
and  1 <  for all  1 n ³ , decreasing with  n , asymptotically equivalent to 
1
2n
, and, in particular, tending to 0 as  n  
grows to infinity. The asymptotic behaviour of hospitals’ contributions reproduces the qualitative features of the 
general property of Chamberlin (1974). We established in a footnote above that the first-stage Nash equilibrium 
of this example reduces to a special case of Chamberlin’s symmetric Nash equilibrium when the number of 
hospitals becomes large enough to make all rationing constraints slack at equilibrium. transfer  associated  with  z ,  this  yields: 
2 1
4. .




Î - ∑ .  Therefore,  hospitals’  potential  graft 
resources  are  all  scarce  at  social  optimum  if  and  only  if  ] [




w   Î   
ɶ . 
 
Example 2: Linear transferable transplant technology 
In this example, we consider the case of convex medical care systems with constant unitary MRC. We 
label this special case the transferable transplant case, by analogy with transferable utility (Bergstrom 
and  Cornes  (1983),  Bergstrom  and  Varian  (1985ab)  and  Bergstrom  (1989)).
20  We  further  restrict 
attention, for calculation purposes, to linear hospital technology. Linear technology being inconsistent 
with the boundary conditions of Assumption 1, we suppose, more precisely, that there exists a positive 
real  number  inf{ : } i i N e w £ Î ,  which  may  be  taken  arbitrarily  close  to  0,  such  that 
( , , ) i i i i i i F x z t ax bz bt c = - - + + , 
3 ( , , ) a b c ++ ÎR ,  whenever  ( , , , ( , , )) ( , , , ) i i i i i i x z t F x z t e e e e ³   (see 
Figures 2a and 2b). 
Let 
* * ( , ) i i x y  denote a local maximum of  u in 
2 {( , ) : } i i i i x y y ax c + Î £ - + R . Note that such a point: 
necessarily  exists  by  continuity  of  u;  is  0 ≫   by  the  boundary  condition  of  Assumption  2,  and 
therefore is the unique global maximum of   u in 
2 {( , ) : } i i i i x y y ax c + Î £ - + R  by the strict quasi-
concavity of utility in 
2
++ R ; is such that 
* *
i i y ax c = - +  (u being strictly increasing in 
2
++ R ) ; and 















. We suppose in the sequel that 
* * ( , ) ( , ) i i x y e e ≫  (see 
Figure 2c). 
                                                 
20 These characteristics of  F  obtain easily from Assumption 1 by letting functions 
r g ,  { , , } r x y z Î , be linear 
whenever  ( , , ) ( , , ) 0 i i i x y z e e e ³ ≫ . A suitable choice of coefficients in the linear representations of functions  
r g yields a linear graph of F , with  ( , , ) i i i F x z t e ³  and unit MRC, for  ( , , ) ( , , ) i i i x z t e e e ³ . As should be clear 
from footnote 














1 = MRC 
Fig 2.c 
The first-order conditions of the second Lemma of the appendix (see Appendix: A-3) then readily 
imply that the agency’s optimal distribution policy at the second stage of clear-sighted equilibrium is 
to  transfer  each  hospital  its  own  contribution  when  all  hospitals  contribute  at  least  e ,  that  is, 
formally:  the  restriction  of 
0 j   to  { : . }
n
n z e z e w + Î £ £ R   is  the  identity  z z ® .
21  The  first-order 
conditions of the third Lemma of the appendix (Appendix: A-3) then imply in turn that all hospitals 
have essentially the same set of optimal production combinations at the first stage of clear-sighted 
equilibrium, precisely: all elements of set 
* * 3 {( , , ) : } i i i i i x y z z e w + Î £ £ R , where 
* * ( , ) i i x y  is the same 
for all  i  (but where, of course,  i w  may vary with  i ), solve hospital  i ’s first stage program for all 
/ 1 . n i n z e e - ³ . In other words, if all hospitals contribute at least  e , the agency’s transfer policy makes 
each hospital’s decision independent of others’ decisions, and also makes hospital’s final production 
of transplant and other care services independent of its own intermediary production of grafts for the 
agency; so that all hospitals end up choosing the same output combination for their final care services, 
and also end up indifferent to their intermediary graft production over range [ ] , i e w . 
                                                 
21 Let  i i z t =  and 
* * * * ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) i i i i x y x y x y = =  for all  i  in the f.o.c., and recall the anonymity property of the 
social utility function implies that marginal social utilities of hospitals’ utilities are equal whenever hospitals’ 










* *, i i y xLet 
* * * * ( , ) ( , ) i i x y x y = . It clearly follows from definitions and paragraph above that any 
* * ( . , . , ) n n x e y e z  
such that  . n e z e w £ £  is a clear-sighted equilibrium production of the medical care system, and that 
t z =  is the corresponding vector of equilibrium transfers. Note, finally, that: other equilibria might 
exist; 
* * ( . , . ) n n x e y e  is the unique socially efficient final production combination of the medical care, as 
a simple consequence of the first-order conditions of Theorem 2 and Corollary 1; and  z w <  for all 
equilibria above except 
* * ( . , . , ) n n x e y e w . In particular, the marginal social utility of the potential graft 
resources  of  all  hospitals  is  null  in  this  example  (while  the  marginal  social  utility  of  hospitals’ 
aggregate contribution  i i N z
Î ∑  is positive).
22 More precisely, some fraction of aggregate transplant 
resources does have a positive marginal social utility since hospitals and the agency have  (0) u  and 
( (0),..., (0)) W u u  utility levels if  0 i i Nw
Î = ∑ , but any  . n e w e ³  suffices for sustaining the equilibria 
above. That is: transferable transplants technology applies if aggregate resources exceed threshold ne  
(technology being linear only for ( , , , ) ( , , , ) i i i i x y z t e e e e ³ ); and this particular technology then makes 
any  amount  of  aggregate  transplant resources in  excess  of  this threshold  (any  positive  difference 
i i N ne w
Î - +∑ ) socially useless.  
 
4-3--Monitored graft production 
 
A simple solution to the coordination problem raised in subsection 4-2 is the monitoring of graft 
production by the transplant agency. This solution actually appears trivial in the setup above, from the 
viewpoint  of  formal  logic.  It  is  interesting  to  develop  because  it  captures,  we  believe,  the 
organizational features of the Spanish transplant system that are at the origin of the latter’s remarkable 
achievements analyzed in section 2 above. 
The  model  is  amended  as  follows. The transplant  agency  hires  physicians and  delegates them  in 
hospitals in order to supervise graft production in each of them, with an objective of maximization of 
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, while  2 3 2 . . . . 0 i i W u F W u c l = ¶ ¶ ¶ = ¶ ¶ > , 
for all i . the latter subject to the legal, technical and endowment constraints detailed above. Formally, this new 
organizational  trait  amounts  to letting  the  agency  decide  (through  its  delegates  in  hospitals)  over 
hospitals’ levels of graft production in  1 ( ,..., ) n z z z = . That is, the agency’s monitoring opportunity set 
now reads  0 ( )
M A w =
3 {( , , ) :  ;  ( , , ) and   for all i}
z n z z x y z
i i i i i i i i i i i N i N z v t t z z g t v v v v z w + Î Î Î £ £ + + £ ∑ ∑ ℝ , 
while its monitoring budget  0
M B  now covers the wages of supervisors in addition to the other costs of 
transplant  provision.  Similarly,  Hospitals’  monitored  opportunity  sets  are  defined  as: 
4 ( , ) {( , , , ) : ( , , );  ( , , );and  } 
M z x y x x x y z y y x y z x y
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i A v t x y v v x g t v v v v y g t v v v v v v B + = Î £ + + £ + + + £ ℝ
 
The public good externality between hospitals vanishes in this new specification of the transplant 
system, since it followed from their individual choice of a level of graft production, which now is 
essentially endorsed by the agency. The distinction between a myopic and a clear-sighted behaviour 
becomes  pointless,  consequently,  in  the  sense  that  the  (Nash  non-cooperative)  equilibrium  of  the 
transplant game is now independent of hospitals’ understanding of agency’s policy. The two-stage 
game  may  be  specified,  accordingly,  as  follows.  Hospitals  play  second,  each  one  solving 
max{ ( , ):( , , , ) ( , )}
x y M z
i i i i i i i i i u x y x y v v A v t Î   with  respect  to  ( , , , )
x y
i i i i x y v v   for  any  given  ( , )
z
i i v t .  We 
denote by 
M
i j  hospital  i ’s monitored reaction correspondence at this stage (solving program above 
for  any  ( , )
z
i i v t ),  and  let 
M j denote  the  associate  product  correspondence  defined  by  
( , ) {( , , , ):( , , , ) ( , ) for all  }
M z x y x y M z
i i i i i i i v t x y v v x y v v v t i j j = Î . The transplant agency plays in the first 
stage  of  the  game,  solving  
1 1 0 max{ ( ( , ),..., ( , )):( , , , ) ( , ) and ( , , ) ( )}
x y M z z M
n n W u x y u x y x y v v v t z v t A j w Î Î   with  respect  to 
( , , )
z z v t . An equilibrium of the game is a state ( , , , , ) x y z v t  that solves the latter program. We refer to 
this third notion of equilibrium as the monitored equilibrium. 
We establish below that monitored equilibrium and social optimum coincide, provided that socially 
efficient production can be achieved by hospitals endowed with equal budgets  B. This optimality 
property implies, in particular, in view of Theorem 2, that a monitored equilibrium exists, and that the 
corresponding socially optimal production of final care services is unique.  
Theorem 5: Suppose that, for any social optimum  ( , , , , ) x y z v t , there exists a combination of general 
inputs v ɶ  such that 
x y
i i v v B + = ɶ ɶ  and ( , , ) ( , ) i i i i i x y z g t v = ɶ  for all i . Then, the monitored equilibrium is a 
social optimum. 
 
Theorem 5 implies a clear advantage of monitored equilibrium, relative to clear-sighted equilibrium, in 
terms of the production of final care services of the medical care system. Optimizing the distribution 
of transplants does not suffice, in other words, for achieving socially efficient production. The latter 
supposes that some control be exerted also on graft production.  This implies in turn some additional 
monitoring  costs,  captured  in  the  simple  model  above  through  the  (positive)  difference  0 0
M B B -  
between the agency’s budgets in the monitored and clear-sighted games. A complete comparative 
evaluation of the two modes of regulation of the transplant care system supposes that their differences 
in terms of socially efficient production be balanced against their differences in terms of budgetary 
costs. The data collected in section 2 suggest that monitoring costs are actually low, relative to their 
remarkable  impact  on  graft  production.  In  other  words,  the  Spanish  experience  shows  a  high 




The economic organization of the transplant care system was characterized as a production economy 
of the public sector operating on the background of incomplete markets of inputs. The collection and 
circulation of transplants by the transplant agency induce public good interactions between hospitals. 
A  socially  optimal  distribution  policy  of  the  agency  cannot  achieve  alone  the  coordination  of 
hospitals’ production decisions at equilibrium and cannot in general attain alone the social optimum 
when potential graft resources are scarce, that is, equivalently, when the rationing constraints over the 
production  of  transplant  inputs  are  binding  at  social  optimum.  Social  optimum  is  attained  by 
eliminating the public good interactions between hospitals through the optimal control of both the distribution and the production of transplant inputs by the agency. The data suggest that more than one 
half of Spain’s donor rate differential with other countries proceeds from an adequate management of 
this  public  good  problem  by  its  national  transplant  organization.  Improving  the  coordination  of 
hospitals’ production of transplants seems the principal and most efficient way for improving national 
donor  rates.  The  other  major  way  consists  of  lowering  donation  refusal  rates  through  adequate 




A-1: Hospital’s production possibility frontier 
 
Lemma 1: There exists a function  F  such that, for any  [ ] ( , ) 0, i i i z t w ++ Î ´ℝ , the set of technically 
accessible  output  combinations  of  hospital  i   is: 
3 1 {( , , ) : ( , , ( ) ( )),  ( , , ) and  }
x z
i i i i i B i i i i i i i x y z x g t B B g z y F x z t z w
-
+ Î £ + £ £ ℝ ,  where 
1 ( ) B g
-   denotes  the 
inverse  of  increasing  partial  function  ( , , )
z z z z
i i i i v g t v B v ® + .  Function  F   is  defined  over  sets 
2 {( , , ) : ( , , ); ( , , ); 0}
x z z z z z
i i i i i i i i i i i x z t x g t B B v z g t v B v v + ++ Î ´ £ + £ + ³ ℝ ℝ ,  and 
2 C   in  the  (non-empty) 
intersection of these convex domains with 
3
++ R . It is decreasing and concave in  i x , decreasing in  i z  






































 where  the partial derivatives of  F , 
x g , 
y g  and 
z g  are respectively evaluated at ( , , ) i i i x z t , ( , , )
x
i i t v s , ( , , )
x
i i t B v s -   and 
1 ( ,( ) ( ), )
z
i B i t g z s
-  
such that 
1 ( ) ( )
z
B i s B g z
- = +  and  ( , , )
x x
i i i x g t v s = .  
Proof: Let 
1 :( , , ) ( , , ( ) ( ))
r r r r z
i i i i i B i G t v z g t v B g z
- ® + ,  { , } r x y Î . Function 
x G , being increasing in 
x
i v  
in 
2
++ + ´ R R  (see Assumption 1), then admits a partial inverse  relative to this variable, that is, there 
exists  a  function 
x h   such  that 
1 ( , ( , , ), ( ) ( ))
x x z
i i i i B i i g t h x z t B g z x
- + =   for  all ( , , ) {( , , ) : ( , , ); ( , , ); 0}
x z z z z z
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i x z t x z t x g t B B v z g t v B v v ++ + ++ Î Î ´ ´ £ + £ + ³ ℝ ℝ ℝ . This domain 
of 
x h is convex and has a non-empty intersection with 
3
++ ℝ  by Assumption 1. The implicit function 
theorem  moreover  implies  that 
x h   is 
2 C   in  the  intersection  of  its  domain  with 
3
++ ℝ ,  with: 
1 2 1/
x x h g ¶ = ¶ ,  2 3 2 2 3 /( ( ))
x x x z z h g g g g ¶ = -¶ ¶ ¶ +¶   and  3 1 2 /
x x x h g g ¶ = -¶ ¶ ,  where    the  partial 
derivatives of 
x h , 
x g  and 
z g  are respectively evaluated at  ( , , ) i i i x z t , 
1 ( , ( , , ), ( ) ( ))
x z
i i i i B i t h x z t B g z
- +  
and 
1 1 ( ,( ) ( ), ( ) ( ))
z z
i B i B i t g z B g z
- - + . And 
x h  is: increasing and convex in  i x  as inverse of increasing 
concave partial functions 
1 ( , , ( ) ( ))
x x x z
i i i B i v g t v B g z
- ® + ; increasing in  i z  and decreasing in  i t  by the 
derivatives  calculated  above  and  Assumption  1.  We  may  let  F   be  defined  by:  
( , , ) ( , ( , , ), )
y x
i i i i i i i i F x z t G t B h x z t z = -   if  0 i x > ;  ( , , ) ( , , )
y
i i i i i F x z t G t B z =   if  0 i x = .  One  verifies 
immediately that  F is concave, decreasing in  i x  and in  i z , increasing in  i t . Its restriction to 
3
++ ℝ  is 
























¶ = ¶ +¶   ¶ +¶ ¶  













  where    the 
partial  derivatives  of  F , 
x g   and 
y g   are  respectively  evaluated  at  ( , , ) i i i x z t , 
1 ( , ( , , ), ( ) ( ))
x z
i i i i B i t h x z t B g z
- +  and 
1 ( , ( , , ), ( ) ( ))
x z
i i i i B i t B h x z t B g z
- - + .■ 
 
A-2: Autarkic equilibrium, social optimum 
 
The proofs of this subsection are simple applications of standard techniques of convex optimization 
(Arrow and Enthoven (1961)). 
Proof of Theorem 1: The existence of 
* * * * * ( , , , , ) i i i i i x y z v t  is a simple consequence of the continuity of 
hospital’s  utility  function,  maximized  in  non-empty  compact  set 
7 {( , , , , ) :( , , ) ( , ),  , and  }
x y z
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i x y z v t x y z g t v t z v v v B + Î £ £ + + £ R   (see  Assumptions  1  and  2). 
The solutions are  0 ≫  by Assumptions 1 and 2 (a  (0) u >  utility suppose a  0 ≫  production ( , ) i i x y  of 
final care services by Assumption 2, which implies in turn a  0 ≫  vector  ( , , ) i i i z v t  of intermediary 
graft production and inputs by Assumption 1). The uniqueness of the optimal final production of care services 
* * ( , ) i i x y follows from the strict quasi-concavity of utility function in 
2
++ R  and convexity of 
opportunity  set 
7 {( , , , , ) :( , , ) ( , ),  , and  }
x y z
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i x y z v t x y z g t v t z v v v B + Î £ £ + + £ R   (the  latter 
implied  by  the  concavity  of  production  functions 
r g ,  { , , } r x y z Î ).  “Unconstrained”  program 
max{ ( , ):( , , , , ) 0,( , , ) ( , ),  ,and  }
x y z
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i u x y x y z v t x y z g t v t z v v v B ³ £ £ + + £   being identical for 
all i , so is the solution 
* * * * * ( , , , , ) i i i i i x y z v t . If 
* * * * * ( , , , , ) i i i i i x y z v t  verifies rationing constraint 
*
i i z w £  with 
a  strict  inequality,  that  is,  if 
* *
i i z w < ,  then  it  solves  “constrained”  program 
* max{ ( , ):( , , , , ) 0,( , , ) ( , ),  ,and 
x y z
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i u x y x y z v t x y z g t v t z v v v w ³ £ £ £ + +   } B £     as  a  simple 
consequence of definitions. The Kuhn and Tucker first-order conditions (f.o.c.) for the constrained 
program characterize 
* * * * * ( , , , , ) i i i i i x y z v t  by Arrow and Enthoven (1961: Theorems 1 and 2)
23. They read 
as  follows:  (i) 
* * * x y z
i i i v v v B + + = ;  (ii) 










  (evaluated  at 
* * * * * ( , , , , ) i i i i i x y z v t );  (iv)  and  there  exists  i g + ÎR   such  that 
* .( ) 0 i i i z g w - = .  Since 
* *
i i z w <   by 
assumption, we must have  0 i g =  in the Kuhn and Tucker conditions, that is,  i g  is determinate and 
0 =  in the f.o.c., and interprets then as the hospital  i ’s marginal utility of potential graft resources. 
The  same  applies  to  any  hospital  j  such that 
*
j i w w ³ .  Finally,  hospital’s  budget  constraints are 
binding at autarkic equilibrium as a simple consequence of Assumption 1-(vi) and increasing utility, 
that is, these assumptions straightforwardly imply that any ceteris paribus increase in hospital’s budget 
increases its maximal utility level in associate autarkic opportunity set.■ 
Proof  of  Theorem  2:  The  social  opportunity  set 
7 {( , , , , ) : ; 
n
i i i N i N x y z v t t z + Î Î Î £ ∑ ∑ ℝ   
;  ;and ( , , ) ( , ) for all i}
x y
i i i i i i i i N z v v nB x y z g t v w
Î £ + £ £ ∑  is non-empty (it contains 0), compact (by 
continuity of  g ) and convex (by concavity of  g ). It has a non-empty intersection with 
7n
++ R  by our 
assumptions relative to the productivity of hospital’s technology (see Assumption 1, notably parts (iv), 
                                                 
23 These theorems of Arrow and Enthoven apply here, in spite of the non-differentiability of objective and 
constraint functions on the lower boundary of their domains (the boundary conditions of Assumptions 1, 2 and 
3), because these functions admit quasi-concave differentiable extensions with same solutions of the program. 
The same remark applies to our use of the first-order conditions of Mas-Colell (1985): D.3.3 in Lemma 3 below: 
the objective and constraint functions of the program admit 
1 C  extensions with same solutions of the program.    (v)  and  (vi)).  The  continuity  of  social  utility  function  1 1 ( , ) ( ( , ),..., ( , )) n n x y W u x y u x y ®   therefore 
implies the existence of a social optimum
* * * * * ( , , , , ) x y z v t , which must be  0 ≫  by Assumption 1 and 
the boundary conditions of Assumption 2 and 3. The optimal production of final care services 
* * ( , ) x y  
is unique by the strict quasi-concavity of  1 1 ( , ) ( ( , ),..., ( , )) n n x y W u x y u x y ®  in 
2n
++ R  and convexity of 
the social opportunity set. The Kuhn and Tucker first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient at a 
0 ≫   solution  of  convex  program  1 1 max{ ( ( , ),..., ( , )):( , , , , ) 0; ; n n i i i N i N W u x y u x y x y z v t t z
Î Î ³ £ ∑ ∑  
'; ; and ( , , ) ( , ) for all  }
x y
i i i i i i i i N z v v nB x y z g t v i w
Î £ + £ £ ∑  by Arrow and Enthoven (1961: Theorems 
1 and 2). Strictly increasing utility and production functions in the positive orthant readily imply that 
constraints  i i i N i N t z
Î Î £ ∑ ∑ and  ( , , ) ( , ) i i i i i x y z g t v £ are binding, with positive associate multipliers, 
in the f.o.c.. Strictly increasing utility and Assumption 1-(vi) moreover imply that aggregate budget 
constraint 
x y
i i i Nv v nB
Î + £ ∑  is also binding, with a positive associate multiplier, at social optimum. 
These remarks and some calculations yield the following system of characterizing f.o.c., where partial 
derivatives are evaluated at the optimum: (i) 
* *  i i i N i N t z
Î Î = ∑ ∑ ; (ii) 
* * x y
i i i Nv v nB
Î + = ∑ ; (iii) for all 
i , 










;  (iv)  and  there  exists  ( , )
n l d ++ + Î ´ R R   such  that 
1 1 . .
x
iW u g l ¶ ¶ ¶ = ,  1 3 2 3
2 3








= + ¶ ¶ +¶ ¶ <
¶ +¶
,  and 
* .( ) 0 i i i z d w - =   for  all  i , 
where l  is the multiplier associated with constraint  i i i N i N t z
Î Î £ ∑ ∑ . Finally, the characterization of 
scarcity in the last part of Theorem 2 is a simple consequence of definitions and the characterizing 
f.o.c. above. ■ 
 
A-3: Agents’ behaviour at clear-sighted equilibrium 
 
Lemma 2: Agency’s transfer policy: The agency’s transfer correspondence at the second stage of the 
clear-sighted  game  identifies  with  a  continuous  function 
0 :{ :0 }
n n z z j w + Î £ £ ® R R   such  that 
0(0) 0 j =  and 
0( ) 0 z j ≫  for all  0 z > . Its restriction to { :0 }
n z z w + Î < £ R  solves, for any given  z , the  following  system  of  first-order  conditions  in  ( , ) x t :  (i)  i i i N i N t z




( , ( , , ))
( , , )
( , ( , , ))
i i i i
i i i
i i i i
u x F x z t
F x z t




;  (iii)  and  there  exists  l ++ ÎR   such  that,  for  all  i , 
1 1 1 1 2 3 ( ( , ( , , )),..., ( , ( , , ))). ( , ( , , )). ( , , ) i n n n n i i i i i i i W u x F x z t u x F x z t u x F x z t F x z t l ¶ ¶ ¶ = .  
Proof: Sets of alternatives  ( , )  i i i A t w  and  0( ) A z  being non-empty, compact and convex for all non-
negative  ( , ) t z   such  that  z w £ ,  and  the  agency’s  utility  function  being  continuous,  program 
1 1 0 max{ ( ( , ),..., ( , )):( , , , ) ( , ) for all  , and  ( )} n n i i i i i i i W u x y u x y x y z v A t i t A z w Î Î     has  one  solution 
( , , ) x y t   at  least,  for  any  fixed  non-negative  z w £ .  That  is,  correspondence 
0 :{ :0 }
n n z z j w + Î £ £ ® R R  is well-defined (i.e. has non-empty values over its domain). Its values 
are  compact  by  continuity  of  u,  and  convex  by  convexity  of 
0 {( , ):( , , , ) ( , ) for all  , and  ( )} i i i i i i i x y x y z v A t i t A z w Î Î  and quasi-concavity of u. 
0(0) {0} A =   by  definitions,  and 
6 (0, ) {(0, , , ) : i i i i i i A y z v y w + = Î £ ℝ  
(0, , ),  (0, , ),   and  }
y y x y z z z x y z x y
i i i i i i i i i i i i i g v v v v z g v v v v z v v B w + + £ + + £ + £   for all i  by definitions and 
Assumption  1-(iii).  These  facts  and  Assumptions  1  and  2  imply  that  the  set  of  solutions  of  the 
agency’s program when  0 z =  coincides with the corresponding set of alternatives of the agency’s 
program,  that  is,  with  set  {( , , ): 0 and 0 (0, , ) for all  }
y
i x y t x t y g B B i = = £ £ ,  the  agency’s  and 
hospitals’ utilities being then  (0) W =  over this whole set. In particular:  { }
0(0) 0 j = .  
Suppose from now on that 0 z w < £ . 
0( )
n A z ++ ÇR   is  non-empty  whenever  0 z > ,  that is, it is  always  possible  for  the agency  to  make 
positive transplant transfers to all hospitals whenever some >0 quantity of transplant is available. The 
agency’s set of alternatives 
7
0 {( , , , ) :( , , , ) ( , ) for all  , and  ( )}
n
i i i i i i i x y v t x y z v A t i t A z w + Î Î Î R  is convex 
for all  z , by the concavity of production functions  ,  { , , }
r g r x y z Î  (see Assumption 1). The boundary 
conditions of Assumptions 2 and 3 relative to utility functions, the strict quasi-concavity of the social 
utility  function  in 
2n
++ R ,  and  Assumption  1  then  readily  imply  that  the  solutions  of  the  agency’s 
program are  0 ≫  vectors ( , , , ) x y v t , which moreover imply a unique optimal production of final care services ( , ) x y , whenever  0 z > . From Lemma 1 and strictly increasing hospital’s utility, such interior 
solutions  can  be  characterized,  equivalently,  as  interior  solutions  to  : 
1
1 1 1 1 0 max{ ( ( , ( , , )),..., ( , ( , , ))):0 ( , , ( ) ( )),and  ( )}
x z
n n n n i i B i W u x F x z t u x F x z t x g t B B g z t A z
- £ £ + Î where 
“interior”  now  means  either  that  ( , , ) 0 x y t ≫   or,  equivalently,  that  0 t ≫   and 
1 0 ( , , ( ) ( ))
x z
i i B i x g t B B g z
- < < +  for all i . The necessary first-order conditions (f.o.c.) for the latter 
2 C  
program  read  as  follows  (e.g.  Mas-Colell  (1985):  D.3.3):  (i)  i i i N i N t z




( , ( , , ))
( , , )
( , ( , , ))
i i i i
i i i
i i i i
u x F x z t
F x z t




;  (iii)  and  there  exists  a  0 ³   real  number  l   such  that 
1 1 1 1 2 3 ( ( , ( , , )),..., ( , ( , , ))). ( , ( , , )). ( , , ) i n n n n i i i i i i i W u x F x z t u x F x z t u x F x z t F x z t l ¶ ¶ ¶ =   and 
( ) 0 i i i N i N z t l
Î Î - = ∑ ∑  for all i .  
Utility  functions  being  strictly  increasing  in  the  positive  orthant  (see  Assumptions  2  and  3)  and 
function F being strictly increasing relative to  0 i t >  in 
3
++ R  (see Lemma 1), the third part of the f.o.c. 
readily implies that  0 l >  and  i i i N i N t z
Î Î = ∑ ∑ , that is, the agency’s marginal utility of aggregate 
graft provision is >0 and aggregate graft production is entirely transferred to hospitals at agency’s 
optimum.  
The  non-convex  program  1 1 1 1 max{ ( ( , ( , , )),..., ( , ( , , ))):0 n n n n i W u x F x z t u x F x z t x £ £  
1
0 ( , , ( ) ( )), and  ( )}
x z
i B i g t B B g z t A z
- + Î   being  equivalent  to  the  convex  program 
1 1 0 max{ ( ( , ),..., ( , )):( , , , ) ( , ) for all  ,and  ( )} n n i i i i i i i W u x y u x y x y z v A t i t A z w Î Î ,  the  necessary  f.o.c. 
above  are  also  necessary  first-order  conditions  for  the  latter.  And  the  f.o.c.  of  program 
1 1 0 max{ ( ( , ),..., ( , )):( , , , ) ( , ) for all  , and  ( )} n n i i i i i i i W u x y u x y x y z v A t i t A z w Î Î   are  also  sufficient 
conditions for an interior solution of the latter by Arrow and Enthoven (1961: Theorem 1). They 
characterize, therefore, the solutions whenever  0. z >  
Let us prove, to finish with, that 
0 j  is single-valued and continuous over { : }
n z z w + Î £ R .  
We  already  proved  that 
0(0) {0} j = .  Let  0 z >   and 
* * * ( , , ) x y t   solve 
1
1 1 1 1 0 max{ ( ( , ( , , )),..., ( , ( , , ))):0 ( , , ( ) ( )); ( )}
x z
n n n n i i B i W u x F x z t u x F x z t x g t B B g z t A z
- £ £ + Î .  We established  above  that  optimal  ( , ) x y   is  unique,  =
* * ( , ) x y ,  and  that 
* 0 t ≫ .  Function  F   being 
increasing  in  transfer, 
*
i t   is  necessarily  unique  for  all  i ,  as  unique  solution  of  equation  in  i t : 
* * ( , , ) i i i i y F x z t = . Therefore, 
0 j  is single-valued over  { : }
n z z w + Î £ R . It identifies, in other words, 
with a function { : }
n n z z w + + Î £ ® R R  over this domain. 
Let sequence ( )
q
q z Îℕ  of elements of { : }
n z z w + Î £ R  converge to 
* z . Suppose first that 
* 0 z > . Then 
0 * ( ) 0 z j ≫  and there exists  0 q Îℕ such that  0
q z >  and 
0( ) 0
q z j ≫  for all  0 q q ³ . Therefore, 
* z  and 
all 
q z   such  that  0 q q ³   verify  the  system  of 
1 C   f.o.c.  above. 
0
0 ( ( ))
q
q q z j ³ ,  being  a  sequence  of 
elements of compact set { : 1}
n
i i N t t + Î Î £ ∑ R , has at least one limit point 
* t  in that set. 
* t  verifies the 
f.o.c. at 
* z  by continuity of the latter. Therefore 
* t =
0 * ( ) z j , and continuity in { :0 }
n z z w + Î < £ R  is 
established. Suppose, finally, that 
* 0 z = . By definition of 
0 j ,  
0( )
q z j  is  0 ³  and verifies inequalities 
0 0 ( )
q q
i i i N i N z z j









  is  well-defined, 
0 0 (0) j = = ,  and 
continuity at 0 is established.■ 
 
Lemma 3: Hospital’s behaviour: Hospital i ’s reaction correspondence at the first stage of the clear-
sighted game is a well-defined, upper hemi-continuous correspondence 
6 : { : }
C n
i z z z j w + + Î Î £ ® R R  
such  that: 
6 ( )
C
i z j ++ Ì R   whenever  / 0 n i z = ; 
2 2 ( )
C
i z j ++ + ++ + Ì ´ ´ ´ R R R R   whenever  / 0 n i z ¹ .  Let 
1 { : }
n z z z w
-
+ Î Î £ ɶ R   be  fixed, 
* * * * ( , , , ) ( )
C
i i i i i x y z v z j Î ɶ   be  such  that 
* 0 i z > ,  and  suppose  that 
0
/ (( , )) i i n i i z z z j ® ɶ  is 
1 C  in  some interval open in ( ] 0, i w  containing 
*
i z . Then, 
* * * * ( , , , ) i i i i x y z v  verifies 
the  following  system  of  first-order  conditions:  (i) 
* * * 0 *
/ ( , , (( , ))) i i i i n i i y F x z z z j = ɶ ;  (ii) 
* * * 0 * *
/ ( , , ) ( (( , )), ) i i i i n i i i x y z g z z v j = ɶ   ;  (iii) 
* *
* * 0 * 1
1 / * *
2
( , )
( , , (( , )))
( , )
i i
i i i n i i
i i
u x y






ɶ ;  (iv)  and  there  exists 
i d + ÎR   such  that 
* * * * 0 * * * 0 * 0 *
2 2 / 3 / / ( , ).( ( , , (( , ))) ( , , (( , ))). (( , ))) i i i i i n i i i i i n i i i i n i i i u x y F x z z z F x z z z z z j j j d ¶ ¶ +¶ ¶ = ɶ ɶ ɶ  
and 
* ( ) 0 i i i z d w - = . If function 
0
/ ( , ) ( , ( , , (( , )))) i i i i i i n i i x z u x F x z z z j ® ɶ  is, moreover, quasi-concave over 
2 {( , ) :0 } i i i i x z z w + Î < £ R , then, the first-order conditions above characterize the  0 ≫  elements of ( )
C
i z j ɶ , that is, 
* * * * ( , , , ) ( )
C
i i i i i x y z v z j Î ɶ  and is  0 ≫  if and only if 
* * * * ( , , , ) i i i i x y z v  verifies the f.o.c. and is 
0 ≫ . 
Proof: Note first that set 
0 ( ( ), ) i i i A z j w  being non-empty and compact for all  ( , ) 0 i z w ³  and utility 
function u being continuous, program 
0 max{ ( , ):( , , , ) ( ( ), )} i i i i i i i i i u x y x y z v A z j w Î  has one solution at 





+ + ® R R  is well- defined. 
Let  / 0 n i z = . We established in Lemma 2 that 
0(0) 0 j =  and 
0( ) 0 z j ≫  whenever  0 z > . And we 
supposed  in  Assumption  1  that  (0, ) 0
x
i g v =   for  all  i v .  Therefore,  hospital  i ’s  optimal  graft 
production  i z  is positive, for then and only then is a  (0) u >  utility level accessible for hospital i  by 
Assumption 2. In other words, if other hospitals contribute nothing, hospital i  is willing to contribute 
something, in order to receive some positive transfer from the agency that allows for a  0 ≫  final 
production ( , ) i i x y  and  (0) u >  utility. 
Let 
1
/ / / / { : }
n
n i n i n i n i z z z w
-
+ Î Î £ R   be  fixed  from  there  on. 
0 *
/ (( , )) 0 n i i z z j ≫   for  any  optimal  graft 
production 
*
i z   of  ( )
C
i z j   by  the  paragraph  above,  so  that  program 
0
/ max{ ( , ):( , , , ) ( (( , )), )} i i i i i i i i n i i i u x y x y z v A z z j w Î   can  be  rewritten  equivalently  as  
0 0 1
/ / max{ ( , ( , , (( , )))):0 ( (( , )), , ( ) ( )),  and  0 }
x z
i i i i n i i i i n i i B i i i u x F x z z z x g z z B B g z z j j w
- £ £ + £ £  
by  Lemma  1.  Solutions  in  ( , ) i i x y   are  “interior”,  that  is, 
* 0 *
/ ( , ( , , (( , )))) 0 i i i i n i i x F x z z z j ≫ ,  by  the 
boundary condition of Assumption 2. But we may have a corner solution in  i z , that is, an optimal 
graft production 
*
i z  equal to either 0 or  i w  (
* 0 i z =  only if  / 0 n i z > ).  
Suppose that optimal graft production 
*
i z  is positive, and that 
0
/ (( , )) i i n i i z z z j ®  is 
1 C  in an interval 
open in ( ] 0, i w  containing 
*
i z . The necessary first-order conditions for solution 
* ( , ) i i x z  of the reduced 
program  above  then  read  as  follows  (e.g.  Mas-Colell  (1985):  D.1):  (i) 
* 0 *
* 0 * 1 /
1 / * 0 *
2 /
( , ( , , (( , ))))
( , , (( , )))
( , ( , , (( , ))))
i i i i n i i
i i i n i i
i i i i n i i
u x F x z z z
F x z z z







;  (ii)  and  there  exists  i d + ÎR   such  that 
* 0 * * 0 * 0 *
2 2 / 3 / / ( , ).( ( , , (( , ))) ( , , (( , ))). (( , ))) i i i i i n i i i i i n i i i i n i i i u x y F x z z z F x z z z z z j j j d ¶ ¶ +¶ ¶ =  and  
* ( ) 0 i i i z d w - = . 
Conversely, if 
0
/ ( , ) ( , ( , , (( , )))) i i i i i i n i i x z u x F x z z z j ®  is quasi-concave over 
2 {( , ) :0 } i i i i x z z w + Î < £ R , if 
0
/ (( , )) i i n i i z z z j ®  is 
1 C  in an interval open in ( ] 0, i w  containing 
* 0 i z > , and if 
* ( , ) 0 i i x z ≫  verifies 
the f.o.c. above, then 
* * ( , ) i i x z  solves reduced program 
0
/ max{ ( , ( , , (( , )))): } i i i i n i i i i u x F x z z z z j w £ , by 
Arrow and Enthoven (1961: Theorem 1). Let us establish, finally, that 
C
i j  is upper hemi-continuous 
(u.h.c.) in { : }
n z z w + Î £ R  for all i .  
Let  ( )
q
q z Îℕ   be  a  sequence  of  elements  of    { : }
n z z w + Î £ R   converging  to 
* z ,  and  sequence 
(( , , , ))
q q q q
i i i i q x y z v Îℕ be such that ( , , , ) ( )
q q q q C q
i i i i i x y z v z j Î  for all q  and converge to 
* * * * ( , , , ) i i i i x y z v . We 
want  to  prove  that 
* * * * * ( , , , ) ( )
C
i i i i i x y z v z j Î .  Note  that 
* * * * 0 * ( , , , ) ( ( ), ) i i i i i i i x y z v A z j w Î =  
6 0 * {( , , , ) :   ( , , ) ( ( ), ),     ,  and  }
x y
i i i i i i i i i i i i i x y z v x y z g z v z v v B j w + Î £ £ + £ ℝ     by  continuity  of  g   and 
0
i j . Let ( , , , ) i i i i x y z v ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ  be any element of 
0 * ( ( ), ) i i i A z j w .  
If  i x ɶ  or  i y ɶ  is  0 = , then 
* * ( , ) ( , ) (0) i i i i u x y u x y u ³ = ɶ ɶ  by Assumption 2.  
Suppose that  ( , ) 0 i i x y ɶ ɶ ≫ . Note that, then, 
0 * ( ) 0 i z j >  and 
0 * 1 ( ( ), , ( ) ( ))
x z
i i B i x g z B B g z j
- < + ɶ ɶ  by the 
definition  of 
0 * ( ( ), ) i i i A z j w   and  Assumption  1.  We  construct  a  sequence  (( , , , ))
q q q q
i i i i q x y z v Îℕ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ   that 
converges  to  ( , , , ) i i i i x y z v ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ   and  is  such  that 
0 ( , , , ) ( ( ), )
q q q q q
i i i i i i i x y z v A z j w Î ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ   for  all  q .  There  exists 
0 q Îℕ such that 
0( ) 0
q
i z j >  and 
0 1 ( ( ), , ( ) ( ))
x q z q
i i B i x g z B B g z j
- < + ɶ ɶ  for all  0 q q ³ , by continuity of 
x g , 
0




- . If 
0 * ( , , ( )) i i i i y F x z z j < ɶ ɶ ɶ , then, by construction of  F (see the proof of Lemma 1), either 
x y
i i v v B + = ɶ ɶ  and 
0 * ( ( ), , )
y y x y z
i i i i i i y g z v v v v j < + + ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ  or 
x y
i i v v B + < ɶ ɶ ; therefore, by continuity of   F ,  
0
i j  
and  g , there exists  1 q Îℕ such that, for all  1 q q ³ :  
0 ( , , ( ))
q
i i i i y F x z z j < ɶ ɶ ɶ , and either there exists  
, x q x y
i i i v v v < + ɶ ɶ   solving 
0 , 0 * ( ( ), , ) ( ( ), , )
x q x q x y z x x x y z
i i i i i i i i i i g z v v v v g z v v v v j j + + = + + ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ   such  that 
0 , ( ( ), , )
y q x y x q x y z
i i i i i i i i g z v v v v v v y j + - + + > ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ,  if 
x y
i i v v B + = ɶ ɶ ,  or  there  exists     
, x q
i v   solving 
0 , 0 * ( ( ), , ) ( ( ), , )
x q x q x y z x x x y z
i i i i i i i i i i g z v v v v g z v v v v j j + + = + + ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ   and 
, y q
i v   solving 
0 , 0 * ( ( ), , ) ( ( ), , )
y q y q x y z y y x y z
i i i i i i i i i i g z v v v v g z v v v v j j + + = + + ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ   such  that 
, , x q y q
i i v v B + < ɶ ɶ ,  if 
x y
i i v v B + < ɶ ɶ . 
We let then:  ( , , ) ( , , )
q q q
i i i i i i x y z x y z = ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ,  
, , x q x q
i i v v = ɶ , 
, y q
i v ɶ  be either 
, x y x q
i i i v v v = + - ɶ ɶ  (if 
x y
i i v v B + = ɶ ɶ ) or 
, y q
i v =  (if 
x y
i i v v B + < ɶ ɶ ), and  
, z q z
i i v v = ɶ ɶ , for all  0 1 max{ , } q q q ³ ; ( , , , )
q q q q
i i i i x y z v ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ  be an arbitrary element of 
0 ( ( ), )
q
i i i A z j w   for  all  0 1 max{ , } q q q < .  If 
0 * ( , , ( )) i i i i y F x z z j = ɶ ɶ ɶ ,  we  have  then 
x y
i i v v B + = ɶ ɶ , 
1 ( ) ( )
z z
i B i v g z
- = ɶ ɶ   and 
0 * ( , , ) ( ( ), ) i i i i i x y z g z v j = ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ   by  construction  of  F (see  Lemma  1),  and  we  let: 
q
i i x x = ɶ ɶ , 
q
i i z z = ɶ ɶ ,   
0 ( , , ( ))
q q
i i i i y F x z z j = ɶ ɶ ɶ , 
, x q
i v ɶ   solve 
0 , 1 ( ( ), , ( ) ( ))
x q x q z
i i i B i x g z v B g z j
- = + ɶ ɶ ɶ , 
, y q
i v ɶ   solve 
0 , 1 ( ( ), , ( ) ( ))
q y q y q z
i i i B i y g z v B g z j
- = + ɶ ɶ ɶ , and 
, 1 ( ) ( )
z q z z
i B i i v g z v
- = = ɶ ɶ ɶ  for all  0 q q ³ ;  ( , , , )
q q q q
i i i i x y z v ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ  be an 
arbitrary  element  of 
0 ( ( ), )
q
i i i A z j w   for  all  0 q q < .  One  verifies  immediately  that  the  sequence 
converges  to  ( , , , ) i i i i x y z v ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ .  We  have  ( , ) ( , )
q q q q
i i i i u x y u x y ³ ɶ ɶ   for  all  q   by  construction,  so  that 
* * ( , ) ( , ) i i i i u x y u x y ³ ɶ ɶ   by  continuity  of  u.  Therefore 
* * * * * ( , , , ) ( )
C
i i i i i x y z v z j Î ,  and  the  upper  hemi-
continuity of 
C
i j  is established.■ 
 
A-4: Existence of clear-sighted equilibrium 
 
The existence of a clear-sighted equilibrium is not warranted, in general, under Assumptions 1, 2 and 
3. The appropriate tool for establishing existence is Debreu’s social equilibrium existence theorem 
(1952), applied to the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium of the first stage of the clear-sighted game. 
The general condition for existence, implied by this theorem, which may fail to hold in the case of 
clear-sighted equilibrium is convex-valued reaction correspondences of hospitals. We show below that 
an equilibrium exists in an acceptable subset of the wider class of medical care systems considered in 
this article. 
 
Lemma 4: If ( , , , ) W u g w  is convex, then 
C
i j  is convex-valued for all i . 
Proof:  We  established  in  the  proof  of  Lemma  3  that  hospital  i ’s  first-stage  program 
0
/ max{ ( , ):( , , , ) ( (( , )), )} i i i i i i i i n i i i u x y x y z v A z z j w Î   was  equivalent  to  program 
0
/ max{ ( , ( , , (( , )))):0 } i i i i n i i i i u x F x z z z z j w £ £  for any fixed 
1
/ / / / { : }
n
n i n i n i n i z z z w
-
+ Î Î £ R , and yielded 
positive  optimal  graft  production  of  hospital  i   whenever  / 0 n i z = .  The  convexity  assumption  of Definition  5  is  therefore  exactly  sufficient  for  the  convexity  of  ( )
C
i z j   for  all  i   and  all 
{ : }
n z z z w + Î Î £ R .■ 
 
Lemma 5: Let the medical care system ( , , , ) W u g w  be such that 
C
i j  is convex-valued for all i . Then 
there exists a clear-sighted equilibrium of ( , , , ) W u g w . 
Proof: 
0 j  is a continuous function { : }
n n z z w + + Î £ ® R R  by Lemma 2, and 
C
i j  is an upper hemi-
continuous correspondence 
6 { : }
n z z w + + Î £ ® R R  for all i  by Lemma 3. Let the canonical projection 
( , , , ) i i i i i x y z v z ®   be  denoted  by  3 pr .  3 1 3 : ( ( ( )),..., ( ( )))
C C C
n z pr z pr z j j F ®   is  an  upper  hemi-
continuous,  convex-valued  correspondence  { : } { : }
n n z z z z w w + + Î £ ® Î £ R R .  Set  { : }
n z z w + Î £ R  
being non-empty compact and convex, 
C F  has a fixed point in { : }
n z z w + Î £ R  by Kakutani’s fixed 
point theorem, that is, there exists 
* { : }
n z z z w + Î Î £ R  such that 
* * ( )
C z z ÎF . There exists, therefore, 
a state 
* * * * * ( , , , , ) x y z v t  such that 
* 0 * ( ) i t z j =  and 
* * * * * ( , , , ) ( )
C
i i i i i x y z v z j Î  for all i .  
* * * * * ( , , , , ) x y z v t  is 
an equilibrium of the  clear-sighted game by construction.■ 
 
The medical care systems of Examples 1 and 2 are convex.  
 
A-5: Rotten kids and abundance 
 
Proof of Theorem 4: Part (i) of the Theorem is a simple consequence of Lemmas 4 and 5 (existence) 
and of Lemmas 2 and 3 (positivity). The qualitative aspects of parts (ii) and (iii) are supported by the 
discussion and the examples that follow Theorem 4 in subsection 4-2-2. Part (iii) is complemented by 
the following clear-cut statements, established below: If all programs { ( , ( , , )): } i i i i i i u x F x z z z w £  have 
a same solution 
* * ( , ) x z , then: rationing constraints are either all identical and binding or all non-
binding at 
* * ( , ) x z  in programs  { ( , ( , , )): } i i i i i i u x F x z z z w £ ; 
* * * * * ( . , ( , , ). , . ) n n n x e F x z z e z e  is a clear-
sighted  equilibrium  production  combination,  and  agency’s  corresponding  equilibrium  transfer  is 0 * * ( . ) . n n z e z e j = ; 
0 * ( ) z j ¶   is  n e =   if  rationing  constraints  are  all  non-binding  in  programs 
{ ( , ( , , )): } i i i i i i u x F x z z z w £ , and  n e ≪  otherwise.   
Let 
* * ( , ) x z  be a solution of { ( , ( , , )): } i i i i i i u x F x z z z w £ , the same for all  i , and let 
* * * ( , , ) F x z z  be 
denoted  by 
* y .  The  boundary  condition  of  Assumption  2  implies  that  production  combination 



















,  and 
* 2
3






+ - =   ¶  
  for  all  i ,  where  partial  derivatives  are  evaluated  at  the 
optimum. 
Identical 
* * ( , ) x y  imply that marginal social utilities 
* * * * ( ( , ),..., ( , )) iW u x y u x y ¶  are identical for all i  
by  the  anonymity  property  of  Assumption  3.  Identical 
* * ( , ) x z   imply  that  hospitals  have  same 
* * *
3(( , , ) F x z z ¶ . The f.o.c. of Corollary  1 then imply that 
* * * ( . , . , . ) n n n x e y e z e  is a socially optimal 
production combination of ( , , , ) W u F w .  
If some rationing constraint is binding at 















i z w =   for  some  i ,  then,  clearly,  all  rationing  constraints  are  binding  and  identical,  so  that,  in 
particular, all hospitals have the same endowment, 
* z = . In other words, rationing constraints are 
either all identical and binding or all non-binding at 
* * ( , ) x z  in programs { ( , ( , , )): } i i i i i i u x F x z z z w £ . 
Function F  being 
2 C  wherever it is defined in 
3
++ R , and then such that  3 0 F ¶ > , the implicit function 
theorem implies the existence of open neighbourhoods U  and V  of 
* z  in  ++ R  and of a 
1 C  function 
:U V y ®   such  that 
* * ( ) z z y = ,  and,  for  all  s U Î ,   
* * ( , , ( )) y F x s s y =     and 
* *
2 3 ( ) ( ( , , ( )) / ( , , ( ))) s F x s s F x s s y y y ¶ = - ¶ ¶ .  The  f.o.c.  of  Lemma  2  then  imply  that  the  agency’s 
second-stage  optimal  transfer  policy  identifies  with  function  1 1 ( ,..., ) ( ( ),..., ( )) n n z z z z y y ®   over 
{ : ;  such that  . }
n
n z U z z e w a a ++ Î £ $ Î = R  (since all hospitals have same 
*
3( , , ( )) i i i F x z z y ¶  for all  z  
in the latter set). In particular: 
0 * * ( ) z z j = ; and 
0 * ( ) z j ¶  is  n e =  if rationing constraints are all non-binding in programs { ( , ( , , )): } i i i i i i u x F x z z z w £ , and  n e ≪  otherwise, that is, if rationing constraints 
are  all  binding  and  identical  in  these  programs.  The  f.o.c.  of  Lemma  3  and  the  quasi-concavity 
properties  of 
0 *
/ ( , ) ( , ( , , ( , ))) i i i i i n i i x z u x F x z z z j ®   (implied  by  the  convexity  of  ( , , , )) W u F w   then 
imply  that 
* * ( , ) x z   solves 
0 *
/ max{ ( , ( , , (( , )))): } i i i i n i i i i u x F x z z z z j w £   for all  i   (see  Lemma  3),  and 
therefore  that 
* * * ( . , . , . ) n n n x e y e z e   is  a  clear-sighted  equilibrium  production  combination  of 
( , , , )) W u F w , and that 
*. n z e  is the corresponding optimal transfer of the agency.■ 
 
A-6: Monitored equilibrium 
 
Proof of Theorem 5: Let  
* * * * * ( , , , , ) x y z v t  be a monitored equilibrium. Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 and the 
definition of monitored equilibrium clearly imply that 
* * * * * ( , , , , ) 0 x y z v t ≫ . Hospital  i ’s monitored 
opportunity  set 
* 4 ( , ) {( , , , ) :
M z x y
i i i i i i i A v t x y v v + = Îℝ  
* * ( , , ),   ( , , ),  and  } 
x x x y z y y x y z x y
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i x g t v v v v y g t v v v v v v B £ + + £ + + + £ is compact, convex, and has 
a  non-empty  intersection  with 
4
++ R .  The  Kuhn  and  Tucker  first-order  conditions  are  therefore 
necessary  and  sufficient  for  convex  program  max{ ( , ):( , , , ) ( , )}
x y M z
i i i i i i i i i u x y x y v v A v t Î   at  interior 
equilibrium solution 
* * * * ( , , , )
x y
i i i i x y v v  by Arrow and Enthoven (1961: Theorems 1 and 2). They read: (i) 
* * x y
i i v v B + = ;    (ii) 
* * * * * ( , , ) ( , ) i i i i i x y z g t v = ;    and  (iii) 
* * * * * * *
1 2
* * * * * * *
2 2
( , ) ( , , )
( , ) ( , , )
y y x y z
i i i i i i i
x x x y z
i i i i i i i
u x y g t v v v v
u x y g t v v v v
¶ ¶ + +
=
¶ ¶ + +
.  Or 
equivalently,  by  Lemma  1:  (i) 
* * x y
i i v v B + = ;    (ii) 
* * * * ( , , ) i i i i y F x z t = ;    and  (iii) 
* *

















* * * * * ( , , , , ) x y z v t  is not a social optimum and let us derive a contradiction. There exists 
then,  by  Theorem  2,  a  social  optimum  ( , , , , ) x y z v t   such  that 
* * * *
1 1 1 1 ( ( , ),..., ( , )) ( ( , ),..., ( , )) n n n n W u x y u x y W u x y u x y > . But then  ( , , , ) ( , )
x y M z x y v v v t j Î  if 
x y
i i v v B + =  
for all  i , by the characterizing f.o.c. of Theorem 2 and of paragraph above. This may be supposed without loss of generality for  ( , , , , ) x y z v t  by the hypothesis of Theorem 8. But  0 ( , , ) ( )
z M z v t A w Î , as 
an immediate consequence of the definition of a social optimum.  Therefore 
* * * * * ( , , , , ) x y z v t  is not a 
monitored equilibrium, the wished contradiction.■ 
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